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Abstract: This dissertation examines the relationship between the ability of a firm to sell
its real assets (asset liquidity) and its cash holdings behavior as well as its cost of debt.
In essay 1, I show that for financially constrained firms there exists a negative relationship
between the liquidity of a firm’s real assets and the size of its cash holdings, however no
such relationship is present for financially unconstrained firms. This indicates a substitution
effect between cash balances and liquid real assets when access to external capital markets
is limited. Additionally, I find that among financial constrained firms the market value
of cash holdings is lower among firms possessing more liquid real assets. In essay 2, I
examine the implications of this cash holdings/asset liquidity relationship on the cost of
corporate debt. First, I develop a simple two period model of credit spreads endogenizing the
cash holdings/asset liquidity trade-off and show that there exists a non-linear (U-shaped)
relationship between credit spreads and asset liquidity. Empirically, I show that indeed
there is a non-linear relationship between credit spreads and asset liquidity such that credit
spreads are decreasing with liquidity for low liquidity firms and increasing for high liquidity
firms. In addition, cash holdings plays a mitigating role in the observed effect of asset
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Why do firms choose to invest in cash? In an economy with frictionless capital markets,
cash holdings are an irrelevant component of corporate financial policy since firms can
access external capital markets instantly at no cost to service any current liquidity needs.
Additionally, the absence of a liquidity premium implies that there is no deadweight loss
associated with holding cash balances. Therefore, cash is a zero net present value investment
and thus the decision of whether or not to hold cash balances has no bearing on the value
of the firm. Capital market imperfections, however, impose a significant cost on external
financing and, as a result, provide a role for a corporate cash policy. A firm facing a
liquidity need can avoid these external financing costs by holding an adequate level of cash
reserves ex-ante. If access to external financing through the debt or equity markets is costly
or unavailable, cash reserves provide a buffer against negative cash flow shocks and allow
firms to continue to invest in negative cash flow states without the assistance of the capital
markets.
Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) argue that there exists a value maximizing
optimal level of cash holdings that is determined by the trade off between the costs and
benefits of holding cash. Many studies1 find that the level of cash holdings is increasing with
external financing costs. As the costs of accessing the debt and equity markets increase,
firms will hold larger cash balances in order to avoid accessing them.
In addition to the traditional debt and equity markets, there is another market that
firms can access in order to meet a financing or liquidity need: the market for asset sales.
A firm can turn to selling its real, productive assets in order to obtain funding. The asset
sale market contributes substantially to the total dollar amount of financing firms raise.
1e.g. Faulkender and Wang (2006), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2004)
1
In 2012, the total value of asset sales reported in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
database was $131 billion, compared to just $81 billion in seasoned equity offerings (Edmans
and Mann, 2013). Figure 1.1 shows that over the time series, the proceeds from asset sales
consistently exceeds those from seasoned equity offerings.
[Figure 1.1 about here.]
While a portion of these asset sales may have been due to operational or strategic
reasons, there are a number of instances where the motives are explicitly for raising capital.
Borisova et al. (2013) find that over half of asset sellers state that financing motives are
the reason for the sales, and Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown
(2013) show that asset sales are related to increases in investment and R&D, respectively,
suggesting that they were undertaken for the purpose of raising capital.
Anecdotally, there are several instances in which firms turned to assets sales in order to
meet current obligations. Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, BP targeted
$45 billion in asset sales to cover the costs of fines and damages related to the disaster.
Asset sales were especially prevalent among financial firms in the midst of the financial
crisis as a means to stave of financial contagion and build up their capital reserves.2 More
recently, Sears has resorted to selling assets with explicit plans to raise $2 billion in liquidity
in 2013.3
With assets sales comprising a non-trivial fraction of the total funds raised in the capital
markets in any given year, it is important to examine their implications on corporate fi-
nancial policy. In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between the market for asset
sales and the firm’s cash holdings policy. There are a number of reasons to suspect that
there is a link between the asset sale market and firms’ cash holdings. For firms that are
financial constrained in the sense that they have limited or no access to the debt or equity
markets, the ability to sell assets would represent a relaxing of financial constraints. If this
is the case, then it will diminish the utility of precautionary cash holdings. But like debt
2For example, BNP Paribas and Societe Generale announced plans to raise $96 billion and $5.4 billion
respectively through asset sales.
3Reuters: “Sears quells liquidity, not retail, fears” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/23/us-sears-
idUSTRE81M0Y720120223
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and equity, financing with asset sales comes at a cost. The cost of asset sales is represented
by the discount (the difference between the true value and the selling price) the firm incurs
when liquidating the assets.
In this dissertation, I extend the literature on cash holdings by examining the role
that the asset sale market plays on corporate cash management policies. In particular, I
investigate how the liquidity of a firm’s real assets affects the firm’s choice of cash holdings
and examine the impact this relationship has on the cost of corporate debt. In the first
essay, I document an empirical relationship between real asset liquidity and corporate cash
holdings and make three contributions to the cash holdings literature. First, I identify a
substitution effect among financially constrained firms between real assets and cash holdings
such that firms with more liquid real assets tend to hold smaller precautionary cash balances.
Second, I show that the market value of cash holdings differs on the basis of the liquidity
of the firm’s real assets, with investors attaching lower values to cash balances held within
firms with more liquid real assets. Third, using exogenous shocks to capital markets to
identify periods of uncertainty, I find that the presence of liquid real assets has an impact
on the cash re-balancing behavior of the firm in the face of increased uncertainty about
the capital markets. The magnitude of this increase is partially mitigated by the presence
of highly liquid assets. Each of these findings is limited to financially constrained firms,
indicating that firms see asset sales as a feasible source of funds when external capital
markets are excessively costly or inaccessible.
In the second essay, we explore the theoretical link between real asset liquidity, cash
holdings, and corporate credit spreads. Specifically, we develop a model in which a firm can
liquidate a portion of its productive assets in order to service debt or finance investment
opportunities. Selling assets comes with transaction costs that materialize in two ways.
The first transaction cost is the discount the firm incurs on the selling price of the asset.
The second cost materializes in the loss of future cash flows resulting from divesting in the
productive asset. In order to avoid these costs, the firm may choose to hold precautionary
cash reserves. The question then becomes should the firm hold precautionary cash balances
or utilize options to voluntarily sell real (productive) assets when necessary to invest in
3
projects or service debt? In our simple, two period model, we assume that the firm is
limited in its access to debt and equity markets but has the ability to liquidate assets in order
to hedge future cash shortfalls that arise due to debt repayment or profitable investment
opportunities. We solve for the optimal level of asset sales and cash holdings and determine
the impact of fire-sale discounts on the level of cash holdings. Finally, we examine the
theoretical implications of the relationship between asset sales and cash holdings on the
cost of corporate debt.
In the final essay, I empirically test the implications of the model as well as implica-
tions suggested by other theoretical models using a reduced-form regression model of credit
spreads. Within this regression framework I examine the relationship between real asset
liquidity and the cost of both secured and unsecured debt. Of particular interest is the inter-
action effects between cash holdings and asset liquidity. Because liquid real assets increase
creditor’s recovery value in default, credit spreads for secured debt should be decreasing
with asset liquidity (Myers and Rajan (1998) and Morellec (2001)). Acharya et al. (2012)
show that because high cash balances provide security for debt holder’s claims, cash hold-
ings are also negatively related to credit spreads. I argue that because cash holdings are a
function of real asset liquidity, the effects of asset liquidity on credit spreads will depend
on the firm’s level of cash holdings. In other words, there is an endogenous relationship be-
tween cash and asset liquidity such that firms with high asset liquidity tend to hold smaller
cash balances. These characteristics individually push credit spreads in opposite directions
(i.e. high asset liquidity widens credit spreads for secured debt while lower cash holdings
narrow credit spreads. See figure 3.6 for a schematic of these relationships). Therefore the
purpose of this essay is to disentangle this relationship and identify which is the driving
force affecting credit spreads as well show how the two characteristics work together in
determining the cost of corporate debt.
4
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Figure 1.1: Seasoned Equity Issuance and Asset Sale Volume
This figure displays the dollar amount of seasoned equity issuances and the dollar amount of asset




Essay 1: Cash Holdings and the Market for Asset Sales
2.1 Introduction
When financial frictions are non-existent, the total value of the firm is completely inde-
pendent of any cash management policies (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). In states of the
world where firms have insufficient funds to continue their operations and investments, they
are able to secure external funding costlessly and proceed undeterred. On the other hand,
because of the absence of a liquidity premium there are no opportunity costs associated
with holding cash. Since there are no costs associated with accessing the capital markets
and there are no costs in holding liquid assets, the decision of whether or not to hold cash
balances is completely irrelevant to firm value.
As we abstract away from a world of perfect capital markets, the role of cash holdings
begins to plays a part in the determination of optimal financial policy. If a firm faces
a liquidity need, it can issue securities to meet that need. However, obtaining external
financing comes at a substantial cost to the firm that could be avoided by holding an
adequate level of cash holdings ex-ante. Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) argue
that there exists a value maximizing optimal level of cash holdings that is determined by
the trade off between the costs and benefits of holding cash. Additionally, Faulkender and
Wang (2006), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2004) find that the level of
cash holdings increases as external financing becomes more costly. By holding larger cash
balances prior to experiencing liquidity shocks, these firms are able to avoid being compelled
to use costly external funds.
In this essay I consider an additional capital market that firms can access that is not
often considered in the literature: the market for asset sales. In addition to issuing debt or
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equity securities, a firm can turn to selling their real, productive assets in order to obtain
funding. Just as there are costs of debt and equity, there are costs associated with asset
sales as well. The cost of asset sales is the difference between the actual value of the asset
and its selling price. The price that real assets command in a sale will depend greatly on
the conditions in the market for the particular firm’s assets. Assets will be able to be sold
at reasonable prices relative to their true value only when they are sold in a competitive
market with a sufficient number of willing buyers. That is, when the market for a firm’s
real assets is sufficiently liquid, the selling price will become closer to the fair value of the
assets. Whether asset sales are a rational or feasible funding source will depend largely on
the liquidity of the market for the firm’s assets.
I examine the relationship between the liquidity of a firm’s real assets and its cash
holdings and make three main contributions to the cash holdings literature. First, I iden-
tify a substitution effect among financially constrained firms between real assets and cash
holdings such that firms with more liquid real assets tend to hold smaller precautionary
cash balances. Second, I show that the market value of cash holdings differs on the basis
of the liquidity of the firm’s real assets, with highly liquid firms valuing cash less. Third,
consistent with the previous literature I find that following spikes in capital market uncer-
tainty all firms increase their precautionary cash reserves. However I find evidence that
the magnitude of this increase is partially mitigated by the presence of highly liquid assets.
Additionally, I show that the ameliorating effects of real asset liquidity on the size of cash
reserves do not apply to financially unconstrained firms, indicating that asset sales are not
a cost effective source of funds when external capital markets are accessible.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Cash Holdings
Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) argue that there are costs and benefits associated
with holding cash and the trade off between them leads to the existence of an optimal
level of cash holdings. The liquidity premium leads to low rates of return to cash and
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represents a substantial cost to holding cash balances. In regards to the benefits, Keynes
(1936) identifies two motives for firms to hold cash: the transaction cost motive and the
precautionary motive. The transaction cost motive, formally developed by Baumol (1952)
and Miller and Orr (1966), acknowledges that firms with liquidity needs face significant
costs in raising funds. Firms can raise the needed cash by various means, such as utilizing
the external capital markets, decreasing payouts to shareholders, or by selling off assets.
Each of these methods imposes significant costs to the firm. Therefore, holding sufficient
cash balances alleviates the need to engage in such costly transactions. The precautionary
motive suggests that given that firms are limited in their ability to raise external funds,
firms with substantial cash balances are better able to withstand negative cash flow shocks
and more able to take advantage of unforeseen investment opportunities. By transferring
current cash flows into cash reserves the firm gains the flexibility to handle these future
events without incurring the costs associated with obtaining external financing. In the
Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order argument, a firm’s securities maybe undervalued
by the market due to information asymmetry. So even for firms that have access to capital
markets, building up financial slack by accumulating cash may be beneficial in order to
avoid selling undervalued securities.
Opler et al. (1999) find empirical evidence that is consistent with this trade-off theory
of cash holdings. They find that factors associated with the degree of financial constraints
(i.e. firm size and credit ratings) tend to be inversely related to cash balances. Similarly
Faulkender and Wang (2006), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2004) each
find that firms facing more costly external financing tend to have greater cash holdings. In
line with the precautionary motive of cash holdings, Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999)
find a positive relationship between cash and measures of risk and investment opportunities
(cash flow volatility, market-to-book, research and development, capital expenditures, and
acquisitions). Additionally, they find that the level of cash holdings are persistent through
time and are actually greater than what a static trade off model of cash balances would
predict. After observing a dramatic increase in the level of cash holdings over recent years,
Bates et al. (2009) find that the increase can largely be attributed to a sharp increase in
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firms’ cash flow volatility in recent years.
Cash reserves played a large part in keeping some firms afloat during the 2008 financial
crisis, as was noted by Campello et al. (2010). They find that while cash balances of
financially unconstrained firms tended to stay level throughout the crisis period, financially
constrained firms drastically depleted their cash, with reserves dropping nearly 20%. Each
of these findings gives the indication that the precautionary motive of cash holdings is quite
strong.
Recent surveys of corporate executives provide supporting evidence regarding the role of
the precautionary motive in determining cash management policies. Lins et al. (2010) find
that 47% of CFOs say they hold cash as a buffer against future cash shortfalls. Similarly,
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that CFOs rank financial flexibility as their main driver
in capital structure decisions. Therefore, by holding cash balances they are better able to
enjoy this desired flexibility.
2.2.2 Asset Liquidity
A firm facing a liquidity shortfall may obtain the necessary funding by either by reducing
payouts to shareholders, utilizing external capital markets, or selling off existing assets.
While selling assets may seem like an unreasonable proposition, a firm facing severe agency
costs (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or adverse selection costs (Myers and Majluf,
1984) may find that the costs of external financing through the debt or equity markets are
sufficiently high enough to justify incurring the high transaction costs associated with asset
sales. In line with these predictions, Kim (1998) finds that managers only sell illiquid assets
when other sources of financing are very costly (i.e. severely financially constrained firms).
If a firm chooses to use asset sales as a source of financing, the value they receive will
depend largely on the asset’s liquidity. Firms that possess assets which can be sold easily
and without a significant loss in value may find that asset sales are a relatively cheap source
of financing when compared to other external capital markets. The liquidation value of the
asset depends largely on two main factors: the number of potential users and the ability of
these users to purchase the asset (Williamson, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). If there
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are few firms that have use for the asset or if all potential buyers lack funds themselves to
purchase the asset, and/or are financially constrained, the demand for the asset will be low
and the asset will sell at a steep discount. Because many assets tend to be industry specific,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predict that the financial condition of industry participants is
the main driver in the liquidation value of assets. Indeed, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and
Pulvino (1998) find that assets that are sold to industry outsiders tend to suffer larger
discounts than sales that occur within the industry.
The theoretical literature makes many connections between asset liquidity and capital
structure. Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that because liquid as-
sets reduce liquidation costs in the event of default, leverage will have a positive association
with asset liquidity. Conversely, Myers and Rajan (1998) and Morellec (2001) predict that
the impact of asset liquidity on leverage depends on whether or not the assets are posted
as collateral. Because the potential for wealth transfers due to asset stripping is higher for
firms with liquid assets, bondholders will require higher returns from these firms if their
claims are not secured. Sibilkov (2009) tests these predictions and indeed finds a multidi-
mensional effect. While there is a positive relationship between asset liquidity and the level
of secured debt, a nonlinear relation exists for unsecured debt.
While asset sales can provide flexibility for firms facing financial constraints or uncertain
access to capital, Bates (2005) finds that the probability that a firm retains the proceeds of
asset sales (i.e. does not repay debt or pay dividends/share repurchases) is not related to
cash holdings. Rather, the probability to retain proceeds is related to the size of the firm’s
growth opportunities. Similarly, Subramaniam et al. (2011) find that diversified firms hold
less cash than focused firms, but they find that this is not due to their increased ability to
sell assets. Instead this finding is due to the fact that the cash flows of the diversified firms
are imperfectly correlated, thus creating a hedge and diminishing the need for precautionary
cash holdings.
Survey responses documented by Campello et al. (2010), however, presents evidence to
the contrary. Regarding the financial crisis of 2008, 70% of CFOs of financially constrained
firms said that they sold more assets during the crisis than before in order to obtain funds.
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In contrast, only 37% of non-constrained CFOs indicated that they sold more assets. This
demonstrates that the ability to engage in asset sales does make firms more flexible in the
sense that they have more feasible avenues to obtain necessary funding.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
As illustrated above, in the absence of necessary liquidity firms can raise funds either from
the external capital markets, by decreasing payouts to shareholders, or by liquidating a
portion of their real assets. For firms with illiquid assets, the prospect of using asset sales
as a means to meet a liquidity need may not be an economically reasonable decision due
to the loss in value incurred during the sale. Firms with more liquid assets, however, incur
a much smaller cost. Therefore liquidating assets to meet liquidity needs may be more
feasible for this subset of firms.
Since liquid assets can be converted to cash with minimal cost, the ability to sell these
assets will reduce the marginal benefit of holding cash reserves. Because cash balances
provide little to no return, the firm will try to minimize their holdings as much as possible
while transferring these balances into productive real assets. In the extreme case where the
firm’s real assets are equally as liquid as cash and they are able to liquidate costlessly, their
real assets could be seen as a preferred substitute. That is, because the rate of return on
productive assets is higher than that of cash, firms will hold no cash balances and liquidate
their real assets whenever they encounter a liquidity need. Relaxing this extreme scenario
brings me to my first hypothesis.
To the extent that liquid real assets can be liquidated in the event of a cash shortage,
they can be seen as imperfect substitutes for cash reserves. Therefore, we would expect a
negative relationship between asset liquidity and cash holdings.
Hypothesis 1a Firms with more liquid real assets will hold smaller cash balances than
firms with illiquid real assets
There will, however, be a limit to which asset sales are effective at reducing a firm’s
optimal cash balance. At very low ranges of asset liquidity, increasing liquidity does not
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move asset sales into a feasible proposition. It is only when assets are sufficiently liquid
that they will have an impact of cash holdings.
Hypothesis 1b There will exist a curvilinear relationship between asset liquidity and cash
holdings such that firms with very liquid real assets will hold less cash, but firms with very
illiquid real assets will not augment their cash policy.
Since liquidating assets is costly, firms will only engage in asset sales as a source of
financing when the costs of external funds are excessively high. So only firms which lack
less costly alternatives will treat their real assets as potential substitutes for cash reserves.
This substitution effect will not exist for firms that have relatively easy access to capital
markets.
Hypothesis 2 Cash balances for financially unconstrained firms will have no relationship
to asset liquidity
If cash holdings are zero net present value investment, then one dollar of additional
cash should be associated with a one dollar increase in the market value of the firm. With
imperfect capital markets, however, there are costs associated with capital raising. These
financing costs are ultimately borne by the investors giving a role for precautionary cash
balances. As such, the valuation of cash holdings within the firm is affected by these costs
of capital raising (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004). Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that
the marginal value of cash declines with better access to capital markets, as the need for
precautionary cash holdings in these firms diminishes. If a firm’s real assets are an accessible
source of financing and thus represent a relaxing of financial constraints, then the value of
cash should decrease as the liquidity of those assets increase.
Hypothesis 3 The market value of cash is lower for firms with high real asset liquidity.
Given that firms have a strong precautionary motive for holding cash, it is quite natural
for their cash management policies to be sensitive to capital market conditions. If a firm’s
ability to access the capital markets in the future is uncertain, they will try to access them
now in order to have funds on hand for future investment and potential cash flow shortfalls.
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Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) note that while commercial and industrial bank lending
puzzlingly increased between September and October 2008 (the heart of the financial crisis),
the majority of this increase was driven by firms drawing down on existing lines of credit
rather than initiating new loans. From news reports, they find that firms that accessed their
credit lines did so due to concerns about the health of the financial sector, with one firm
stating they drew down their credit lines “to ensure access to liquidity to the fullest extent
possible at a time of ambiguity in the capital markets”. In a survey of firms following the
2008 financial crisis, Campello et al. (2011) find that a large number of firms utilized their
lines of credit to increase their cash reserves over fears that their access to credit will soon
be limited. This behavior was, for the most part, limited to financially constrained firms
whose access to external capital would most likely be the first to become rationed.
Along similar lines Almeida et al. (2004) and Duchin et al. (2010) find that following
negative macroeconomic shocks, the propensity to save cash flows increases among finan-
cially constrained firms while remaining constant for unconstrained firms. In the face of
political uncertainty, Julio and Yook (2012) find that cash reserves increase in the year lead-
ing up to national elections and revert to normal levels once the uncertainty of the election
is resolved. This cash hoarding behavior in the face of uncertain future credit conditions is
indicative of a strong precautionary motive of cash balances.
Asset sales can serve as a feasible source of financing when access to capital markets is
limited. As long as the costs of selling off assets are low enough, liquid real assets on the
balance sheet can reduce the marginal benefit of holding cash balances. Therefore, firms
with more liquid assets will not find it necessary to increase their cash holdings in response
to capital market shocks to the same extent as other more illiquid firms.
Hypothesis 4a Firms with high asset liquidity will increase their cash holdings to a lesser
degree following uncertainty shocks.
During times of capital market uncertainty, not all firms will be rationed from external
financing. While financially constrained firms may have a difficult time obtaining funds,
unconstrained firms will face less restrictions. If a firm continues to enjoy relatively unre-
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stricted access to external capital markets even during times of uncertainty, the ability to
liquidate assets to raise funds becomes less attractive.
Hypothesis 4b Asset liquidity will have no relationship with cash holdings in response to
uncertainty shocks for financially unconstrained firms.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Sample Construction
The sample includes data on all firms covered by COMPUSTAT quarterly database over the
period of 1982-2013. Firms in the financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4000-4999)
industries are excluded, as well as firms with missing cash and total asset values. The final
sample results in 18.179 unique firms and 614,377 quarter-year observations. The asset
liquidity measure is constructed using the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum
Mergers and Acquisition database. More details on this sample are provided in the next
section.
2.4.2 Asset Liquidity Measure
Many studies use balance sheet proxies of asset tangibility, such as research and development
expense or the proportion of plant, property, and equipment on the firm’s balance sheet to
measure asset liquidity (e.g. (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lemmon et al., 2008; Faulkender
and Petersen, 2006). These measures, however, do not touch on the liquidity of the firms
assets because while the assets may be tangible in the sense that they are physical assets,
the liquidity value of the assets can not necessarily be determined. As Benmelech (2008)
points out, ”oil rigs, satellites, and railways are all very tangible, yet their liquidation values
are fairly low.” Other studies tend to focus on a small subset of firms (e.g. Kim (1998),
Benmelech (2008), Pulvino (1998), Ramey and Shapiro (2001)), which inhibits our ability to
observe the broad cross-sectional relationship of asset liquidity and other financial variables.
For this paper, I use the industry asset liquidity index of Schlingemann et al. (2002)
and Sibilkov (2009) which measures the total value of corporate transactions in an industry
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relative to the total value of industry assets. This measure follows along with the idea of
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that assets tend to be industry specific. Industries with more
active markets for corporate transactions indicates that there are more potential buyers for
the assets, and thus smaller discounts in liquidation. Because the measure is not constrained
to a specific industry, we are able to get a broader look at the cross-sectional relationship
between cash and asset liquidity. Additionally, because the index is exogenous to the
individual firms, we are able to examine a clear picture free from other confounding effects
within the firm.
The index is constructed as follows. From Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, I identify
20,362 corporate transactions completed between 1982 and 2013 in which the form of the
deal is classified as either an acquisition of assets or an acquisition of certain assets. I
require that the value of the deal is disclosed and that the target is either a publicly traded
firm or a subsidiary. Each transaction is assigned to the target firm’s industry as defined
by its 2 digit SIC code. The asset liquidity index is then computed as the ratio of the sum
of industry transactions within the year to the total industry book value of assets (each
converted to 1984 dollars). Industries which had no corporate transactions within a year
receive an index value of 0 for that year. Because the liquidity of the industry should not
solely depend on the number of transactions in any one single period, I use a five-year
moving average of the index as the proxy for industry-wide asset liquidity. This procedure
results in 1,838 industry-year values for the index. All firms within the same industry will
each have identical values for the liquidity index each year.
[Table 2.1 about here.]
Table 2.1 shows the distribution and mean values of the asset liquidity index over the
sample period. There is quite a large disparity in the degree of asset sale activity amongst
the industries. At the bottom end of the distribution are industries which exhibit very little
turnover of their assets. For example, firms in the 5th percentile of the asset liquidity index
sold 0.18% of their assets in an average year. In contrast, firms at the 95th percentile of
the index sold, on average, 3.19% of their assets in a given year. On average, industries in
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the economy sold off 1.27% of their total assets each year.
[Table 2.2 about here.]
Table 2.2 illustrates the persistence of the asset liquidity index over time. Each year, I
segment the asset liquidity index into quartiles, placing the lowest liquidity industries into
quartile 1 and the highest liquidity industries into quartile 4. Table 2.2 shows that while
there is substantial correlation between contemporaneous asset liquidity and past liquidity,
the correlation diminishes over time. This result is not surprising both from an economic as
well as a methodological perspective. By construction, the asset liquidity index is smoothed
using a five year moving average to limit the effect of extraordinary industry-years in which
a few large asset sale transactions which may portray an industry’s assets to be more liquid
than they actually are. This moving average correction naturally introduces a level of auto-
correlation into the index. From an economic point of view, we would expect liquidity to be
a characteristic which is relatively slow changing. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that
acquisition activity is higher in deregulated and low-tech industries with low research and
development activity and low growth options. However, as shown by Andrade et al. (2001)
restructuring activity often occurs in industry waves. These facts account for the relatively
strong, but diminishing auto-correlation shown in the asset liquidity index.
[Figure 2.1 about here.]
Figure 2.1 plots the time series of the economy-wide average asset liquidity index.1
While there does not appear to be any distinct, constant trends over the sample period
there are some time periods which display some interesting patterns that align closely with
historical events. The uptrend in the mid-late 1980s and the subsequent fall in the early
1990s corresponds with the height and fall of the leveraged buyout boom. The peak of the
asset index occurred in 1998, around the time of the high-tech boom.
1The yearly economy-wide liquidity index is computed by aggregating each industry liquidity index for
the particular year.
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2.4.3 Capital Market Uncertainty Measure
As a measure of capital market uncertainty, I identify spikes in the VIX index from the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange. More specifically, I define a shock as a two standard
deviation increase in the VIX within a three month period and the event period as the
quarter in which a shock occurs. Using this method, I identify four shocks that occurred
during the sample period. The shocks correspond tightly with unanticipated real events
which can be consider exogenous to the contemporaneous economic conditions and, as such
could affect all firms to an equal degree.
Figure 2.2 plots the VIX index from 1990 to 2012 and identifies the periods in which a
jump in implied volatility occurred. The event quarters are Q3 1990, Q3 1998, Q3 2001,
and Q3 2008. These dates correspond with the start of the Persian Gulf War, the default of
Long Term Capital Management (LCTM), the September 11 terror attacks, and the recent
financial crisis, respectively. These dates also coincide with the event date identified by
Bloom (2009) and Kim and Kung (2014) who find these shocks affect productivity as well
as corporate investments.
[Figure 2.2 about here.]
To identify the effect of a uncertainty shock on firm behavior in regards to cash holdings,
I define a set of indicator variables, After(t), where t indicates the number of quarters
before or after the uncertainty event and t = 0 indicates the event quarter in which the
shock occurs.
2.4.4 Control Variables
The main dependent variable used throughout the study is the cash ratio (cash + mar-
ketable securities/book value of assets). To control for the known firm-specific determinants
of cash holdings, I select variables in accordance with the findings of Opler et al. (1999).
Specifically, I calculate Size (log of total assets), market-to-book ratio (market value of eq-
uity/total assets), cash flow(EBIT+depreciation-taxes), net working capital(current assets-
current liabilities), acquisitions (acquisitions/total assets), R&D (research and development
19
expense/sales), leverage(total debt/total assets), and industry cash flow volatility. Addi-
tionally I include an indicator variable for credit rating, that takes on a value of 1 if the
firm has an S&P credit rating of BBB- or higher, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I include a
dividend dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend and 0 otherwise. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to limit the effect of outliers.
2.4.5 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics of the variables included in the study. The average
firm in the sample has $97.8 in total assets. On average (median), firms hold 17.7% (8.4%)
of their assets in the form of cash and marketable securities.
[Table 2.3 about here.]
Table 2.4 displays the correlations of the independent and dependent variables.
[Table 2.4 about here.]
Table 2.5 illustrates the difference in characteristics amongst firms which are classified
as High Liquidity and Low Liquidity. I designate firms which are at the top 25% on the
liquidity index as High Liquidity and those at the bottom 25% as Low Liquidity. Firms
in the two liquidity groups differ greatly in regards to their characteristics. High liquidity
firms tend to carry larger cash balances. Additionally, high liquidity firms, on average, tend
to be smaller, more highly levered, have more capital expenditures, and have less research
and development expenses.
[Table 2.5 about here.]
Because many of these characteristics are known determinants of cash holdings, these differ-
ences may lead one to conclude that they are the cause of the heterogeneity in cash holdings
between the two liquidity groups. However upon closer inspection, the differences in firm
characteristics do not result in relationships which we would expect given previous evidence
in the literature. For example, Opler et al. (1999) find that larger firms hold smaller cash
balances due to their increased access to external capital markets. But as shown in table 2.5
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, low liquidity firms are larger on average yet hold more cash. Similarly Opler et al. (1999)
find that firms with more volatile cash flows and less net working capital (characteristics
of high asset liquidity firms) hold larger cash balances. But puzzlingly, these high liquidity
firms hold less cash. The relationship of cash with other characteristics such as the market
to book ratio and leverage correspond with the previous literature. However given the fact
that these two groups differ in an unpredictable manner, we can not conclude that it is
simply differences in these previously determined firm characteristics that is driving the
divergence in cash holdings between firms with high and low asset liquidity.
[Figure 2.3 about here.]
Figure 2.3 plots the times series relationship of between asset liquidity and the level of cash
holdings for financial constrained (top graph) and financially unconstrained firms (bottom
graph).2 For financially constrained firms a visible pattern appears such that firms with low
asset liquidity hold more cash than high asset liquidity firms throughout the entire sample
period. Conversely, we see no such pattern for unconstrained firms. The relationship
between asset liquidity and cash tends to fluctuate over time with some periods indicating
high asset liquidity firms hold more cash, and in other periods the opposite. These graphs
hint that that a relationship exists between real asset liquidity among financially constrained
firms, but not among unconstrained firms. I will test this conjecture more formally below.
[Table 2.6 about here.]
Table 2.6 displays the behavior of cash over asset liquidity quartiles. Firms in the
bottom 25% of the asset liquidity index in a given year are assigned to quartile 1, firms in
the top 50% are assigned to quartile 2, and so on. Panel A examines the full sample period.
As shown previously, firms with high asset liquidity tend to have smaller cash holdings
(13.3% versus 16.4%). Interestingly, there appears to be a degree of non-linearity in the
relationship of asset liquidity to cash. Cash holdings are not monotonically increasing as
we move from high asset liquidity to low asset liquidity. Instead, cash holdings rise in the
2Financial constraint here is represented by credit rating. If the firms is rated BBB+ or better it is
classified as unconstrained. If the rating is lower than BBB+ or missing the firm is classified as constrained
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middle portion of the distribution before falling again at the low liquidity region. As we
segment the sample into the pre and post financial crisis period (defined as observations
before and after 2008, respectively) this non-linear pattern remains apparent.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Asset Liquidity and the Level of Cash Holdings
If cash holdings and liquid real assets can be treated as substitutes, firms with more liquid
assets will tend to hold less cash. To test the hypotheses, I estimate cross-sectional regres-
sions, employing the techniques of Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009). Controlling
for the common determinants of cash holdings, I first examine the relationship between
asset liquidity and cash holdings. For each firm I estimate a regression of the form
Cashi = β0 + β1AssetLiquidityi + β2Xi + ǫi, (2.1)
where AssetLiquidity is a continuous measure of the asset liquidity index described above
and Xi is a vector of control variables containing asset size, market to book ratio, cash
flow, net working capital, acquisitions, research and development, leverage, and cash flow
volatility. Because the level of cash a firm chooses to hold may depend on contemporaneous
economic and industry conditions, all regression are estimated using time and industry fixed
effects. Additionally, standard errors are clustered at the firm level to control for within
firm error dependence.
Table 2.7 presents coefficient estimates of equation 2.1. From models (1) and (2) of
table 2.7, we can see that a linear relationship between cash and real asset liquidity does
not hold.
[Table 2.7 about here.]
In model (1), asset liquidity alone fails to have any explanatory power on the level of cash
firms hold. After controlling for various determinants of cash holdings, real asset liquidity
continues to lack explanatory power. In model (3) I include a quadratic term into the model
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to capture any potential non-linearities in the relationship between cash holdings and asset
liquidity as predicted by hypothesis 1b. Specifically, I estimate the following model.
Cashi = β0 + β1AssetLiquidityi + β2AssetLiquidity
2
i + β3Xi + ǫi, (2.2)
Consistent with hypothesis 1b, model (3) of table 2.7 illustrates a potential curvilinear
relationship between cash and asset liquidity. The quadratic term AssetLiquidity2i is nega-
tive, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship. That is for high levels of asset liquidity,
there will be a decrease in cash with respect to an increase in asset liquidity. But for lower
levels of liquidity, cash holdings may be increasing with asset liquidity. Model (4) examines
this non-linearity further by generating a set of indicator variables MidLiq1, MidLiq2, and
HiLiq which take on a value of 1 if the firm is in the second, third, and fourth quartile of
the asset liquidity index, respectively and 0 otherwise. Firms in the first liquidity quartile
are omitted, therefore the coefficients on these variables represent the sensitivity of cash to
asset liquidity relative to a low liquidity firm. Again, a curvilinear relationship is visible
between asset liquidity and cash. While firms in the second quartile hold less cash than
those in the first quartile, the direction of the relationship flips as firms move into the third
quartile. Firms in the third quartile hold more cash than those in the first quartile.
Relative to low liquidity firms, firms in the top quartile of the asset liquidity index hold
significantly larger cash balances. As the relationship between cash and asset liquidity is
non-monotonic, I choose to focus on these two extreme liquidity groups (quartile 1 and
quartile 4) for further analysis.
[Table 2.8 about here.]
Table 3.6 presents coefficient estimates of a modified version equation 2.1. Rather than
using the continuous variable for the asset liquidity index, I instead create an indicator
variable HiLiq which represents firms with high degrees of real asset liquidity. HiLiq takes
on a value of 1 if the firm is in the top 25% of the liquidity index in a given year and 0
otherwise. Model 1 shows a negative relationship between the level of cash balances and
asset liquidity. Firms ranked in the upper 25% in terms of the asset liquidity tend to hold
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significantly less cash than all other firms. Even after controlling for the main determinants
of cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999) in Model 2, the negative relationship between cash
and asset liquidity still remains. This result suggests that firms with highly liquid real
assets treat these assets as potential substitutes for cash balances. As Bates (2005) and
Borisova et al. (2013) show, firms utilize asset sales in order to undertake investment. If
assets are sufficiently liquid, selling assets to produce needed cash for investments or other
purposes becomes a more feasible prospect. And thus, the need to hold large precautionary
balances is diminished. In models (3) and (4), I segment the sample into two time periods:
the pre-Financial Crisis period (1982-2007) and the post-Financial Crisis period (2008 and
onward). The negative relationship between cash holdings and asset liquidity holds in both
of these distinct economic environments.
2.5.2 Financial Constraints, Real Asset Liquidity and Cash
To examine the differential effects of asset liquidity on cash holdings among financially
constrained and unconstrained firms, I estimate equation 2.1 on a segmented sample using
two measures of external financing constraints commonly used in the literature: the Whited
and Wu (2006) index (WW), and the SA index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).3
Whited and Wu (2006) measure of financial constraints by using a structural model of
investment to determine the relationship of several variables to the shadow price of raising
new equity capital. The coefficients from the model are then used to compute index values








where DIV equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend and 0 if it does not, LTDebt is long term
debt, ISG is industry sales growth rate, and SG is the firm’s sales growth rate. Higher
values in the WW index correspond with increasing financial constraints.
3The Kaplan-Zingales (1996) measure of constraints was also considered, but not used because its con-
struction results in a mechanical negative relation between cash holdings and financial constraints.
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Hadlock and Pierce (2010) analyze qualitative information from financial reports to
develop their measure of financial constraints. They find that the size and age of the firm
are the two major predictors of financial constraints. The SA index is thus constructed as
SA = −0.737Size+ 0.043Size2 − 0.040Age,
where size is the log of inflation-adjusted book assets and age is the number of years the firm
is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat. As with the WW index, high SA
index values are associated with greater external financing constraints. For both indexes,
firms are classified as financially constrained if their index values for a particular year rank
in the upper 33% and unconstrained if their index values are in the lower 33%.
[Table 2.9 about here.]
Table 3.6 illustrates the effect that external financing constraints have on the real asset
liquidity-cash holdings relationship. In line with hypothesis 2, we see that the negative
relationship between asset liquidity and cash is a phenomenon that is largely isolated to
financially constrained firms. Model (2) shows that among firms that are constrained as
defined by the WW index, those that possess liquid real assets tend to hold significantly less
cash. Conversely among firms that are unconstrained according to the WW index, there
is no significant difference in the cash holdings of high and low liquidity firms. This same
pattern holds as financial constraints are defined by the SA index in models (3) and (4).
This finding supports the argument that liquidating assets for the purpose of generating
cash is only a feasible strategy when sources of external financing are excessively costly. The
costs of accessing external capital markets for financially unconstrained firms are relatively
low. For financially constrained firms, however, the costs may be sufficiently high enough
that liquidating assets may be a beneficial method of raising funds.
2.5.3 Asset Liquidity and the Value of Cash
Next, I examine the impact that the liquidity of a firm’s real assets has on the market value
of cash holdings. From hypothesis 3, if a firm’s real assets are sufficiently liquid they can
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serve as an alternative to using external capital markets. This effectively reduces financing
constraints. With reduced financial constraints, the value of precautionary cash holdings
should diminish (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004).
To test this hypothesis, I use the cash valuation methodology of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).
Their methodology relates them market value of the firm to various firm characteristics.
In particular I am able to examine how the effect of a one dollar increase in cash holdings
on the market value of the firm differs between high asset liquidity and low asset liquidity
firms. The regression takes the form
Vi,t = α+ β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi.t
+ β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di.t
+ β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16dCi,t + β17dCi,t+1 + ǫi,t, (2.3)
where Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t. dXt
is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t divided by total assets in year
t ((Xt −Xt−1)/At). dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t+ 1 to year t divided
by assets in year t ((Xt+1−Xt)/At). A is the book value of assets. V is the market value of
the equity plus the book value of debt. E is earnings defined as earnings before extraordinary
items plus interest plus deferred tax credits plus investment tax credits. NA is net assets,
which is defined as total assets minus cash. RD is research and development expense.
When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. D is common dividends. C
is liquid assets, defined as cash and cash equivalents. The variable of particular interest in
this model is dCi,t, with the coefficient on this variable representing the marginal value of
an additional dollar of cash holdings.
Because of potential cross-correlation in the residuals of the individual firms, the re-
gression in equation 2.3 is estimated using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology,
which involves running yearly cross-sectional regressions and using the series of coefficients
to make inferences. The coefficients reported are the mean of the cross-sectional regression
coefficients, while the standard errors are derived from the time series of coefficients.
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[Table 2.10 about here.]
Table 2.10 provides evidence supporting this role of liquid real assets in reducing the
value of additional dollar of cash in the firm. The variable of interest is dCt, which can
be interpreted as the marginal value of cash. The coefficient on dCt represents the dollar
change in the market value of firm related to a $1 increase in cash holdings. For the full
sample, we can see that a $1 increase in cash holdings is associated with a $1.274 increase in
the firm’s market value. As we segment firms based on their real asset liquidity, we can see
that the market values of cash holdings for these firms are quite different. For firms with
highly liquid assets, the marginal value of cash holdings is just $0.647 versus $1.208 for low
asset liquidity firms. This difference in the marginal value of cash is both statistically and
economically significant.4
A potential concern of the model in equation 2.3 is that changes in cash holdings may be
correlated with expectations of future growth opportunities. So following Pinkowitz et al.
(2006), I also estimate the model replacing the changes in cash holdings with the level.
Vi,t = α+ β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi.t
+ β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di.t
+ β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16Ci,t + ǫi,t (2.4)
In this model, the coefficient on the level of cash holdings is an estimate of the sensitivity
of the market value of the firm to a one dollar increase in cash holdings. However, if the
variables in the valuation model adequately capture expectations about future growth, the
coefficient on the level of cash holdings can be interpreted as the market value of one dollar
of cash in the firm.
[Table 2.11 about here.]
Table 2.11 presents results of this modified regression model. The results indicate that the
4Following Pinkowitz et al. (2006), I test the significance of the difference by interacting the dummy
variable for high asset liquidity with a constant and every independent variable in equation 2.3 and estimate
that equation using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) technique.
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market values of firms with high asset liquidity are less sensitive to the level of cash holdings
than firms with low asset liquidity. For firms with low asset liquidity, we see a coefficient
on Ct of 1.566 compared to 1.199 for high liquidity firms. This indicates that the value of
low asset liquidity firms is more sensitive to the size of their cash reserves. Alternatively,
this result shows that the market attributes a higher value to the cash holdings of low asset
liquidity firms.
Taken together, the findings in tables 2.10 and 2.11 indicate that firms may view their
liquid real assets as an additional source of capital that may be used alongside or in lieu of
the traditional debt and equity markets. This flexibility effectively reduces their financing
constraints and as a result reduces the value that investors attribute to additional precau-
tionary cash balances.
2.5.4 Financial Constraints and the Marginal Value of Cash
Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that the marginal value of
cash is higher among financially constrained firms. They argue that because financially con-
strained firms may face prohibitively high external financing costs, holding large amounts of
internal capital is quite valuable. If a financially constrained firm’s real assets are sufficiently
liquid, then the potential for asset sales may effectively reduce its financial constraints and
thus lower the value of an additional dollar of cash within the firm. As hypothesis 2 argues,
for unconstrained firms the prospect of selling assets to raise capital is unlikely since other
capital markets are readily accessible at reasonable costs. Therefore possessing liquid real
assets should not affect the marginal value of cash for these financially unconstrained firms.
To examine whether the effect of asset liquidity on the value of cash depends on the de-
gree of financial constraints the firm faces, I group firms into 4 different financial constraint-
asset liquidity groups. I first rank firms according to the asset liquidity index over the entire
sample, assigning firms in the upper 25% of the index to the HiLiq group and those at the
bottom 25% to the LowLiq group. Similarly, over the entire sample I rank firms on their
WW and SA index values and assign firms in the top 33% of the index to the financially
constrained group and those at the bottom 33% to the unconstrained group. Firms are
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then grouped togther across the 4 different constraint-liquidity combinations (i.e. uncon-
strained/high liquidity, constrained/ low liquidity, etc.).
[Table 2.12 about here.]
I estimate equation 2.3 on this segmented sample. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 present co-
efficient estimates of the model. The coefficient of interest is dCi,t which represents the
marginal value of an additional dollar of cash. Consistent with hypothesis 2, among finan-
cially unconstrained firms the marginal value of cash does not differ significantly between
high liquidity and low liquidity firms. When constraints are defined by the WW index
an additional dollar of cash in an unconstrained firm with high asset liquidity is worth
$0.586, versus $0.922 for low liquidity firms. The difference between these two values is not
statistically different from zero (p-value of difference = 0.412).
In contrast, there does exist a significant difference in the marginal value of cash between
high asset liquidity and low asset liquidity firms among those classified as financially con-
strained. It is among these firms that asset sales may be seen as a method to ease external
financing constraints when debt and equity markets are inaccessible. The marginal value
of cash for constrained firms with high liquidity is $0.817, compared to $1.184 for low asset
liquidity firms (p-value of difference = 0.037).
[Table 2.13 about here.]
The same pattern holds when financial constraints are assigned according the SA index
as shown in table 2.13. For unconstrained firms, the marginal value of cash is $0.314 for high
liquidity firms and $0.745 for low liquidity firms. The difference in these values, again, is
not statistically significant at a meaningful level (p-value of difference = 0.117). Conversely,
there is a significant disparity in the value of among firms with financial constraints. The
value of cash for high liquidity firms is $0.772 versus $1.216 for low liquidity firms (p-value
of difference = 0.014). These findings suggest that the market views the increased potential
for asset sales, by way of higher asset liquidity, as a path to lessen financial constraints.
Financially constrained firms with liquid real assets do not have to rely as heavily on internal
financing, and as a result additional dollars of cash holdings are valued less.
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2.5.5 The Response of Cash Holdings to Uncertainty Shocks
Next, I investigate the impact of capital market uncertainty on cash holdings and the role
liquid real assets play in firms’ reactions to surprise events that shock the capital markets.
I augment the baseline regression in equation 2.1 by including the set of capital market
uncertainty indicator variables described previously and estimate the following
Cashi = β0 + β1HiLiq + β2After(1) + β3After(1)×HiLiq + β4Xi + ǫi (2.5)
whereAfter(1) is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if it is the period subsequent
to the shock event and 0 otherwise. By focusing on the interaction effect between HiLiq
and the shock period indicator, we will be able to see how the presence of liquid real assets
affects how firms augment their cash balances in response to capital market shocks.
[Table 2.14 about here.]
Table 2.14 shows the effects of capital market shocks on cash holdings in the quarter
following the shock event. Control variables are not reported for brevity as they remain
fairly constant throughout each specification. Model (1) shows that consistent with the prior
literature (Campello et al., 2011), all firms tend to increase their cash balances following
a uncertainty shock. This is in line with the precautionary motive of cash holdings. As
uncertainty increases, firms will increase their cash balances to ensure that they will have
sufficient funds to cover potential operating losses in the future and as well as to take
on future investment opportunities when access to external capital markets becomes more
uncertain. Model (2) includes an interaction term between the uncertainty shock and asset
liquidity (HiLiq x After(1)) to highlight the effect asset liquidity has in periods of capital
market uncertainty. For the full sample, asset liquidity plays no role in determining the
cash adjustment following an uncertainty shock.
For financially constrained firms, however, there is some evidence that asset liquidity
has an effect on the degree to which firms increase the cash balances following a shock
event. Among firms that are constrained as defined by the WW index, cash balances in-
creasing subsequent to a shock. But firms that have high asset liquidity will increase their
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cash holdings to a lesser degree. In contrast, high asset liquidity firms that are classified
as unconstrained according to the WW index do not display this phenomenon. For un-
constrained firms, asset liquidity does not affect firms’ cash re-balancing behavior. This is
inline with intuition. As financially unconstrained firms will have relatively easy access to
capital markets even after a capital market shock, utilizing asset sales to generate funds
would remain an unreasonable course of action. Strangely, this result does not obtain when
external financing constraints are defined by the SA index. For both constrained and un-
constrained firms, real asset liquidity fails to affect cash re-balancing behavior following
capital market shocks.
To further examine the role of asset liquidity on cash policy in response to uncertainty,
I investigate the dynamic effects of an uncertainty shock to cash balances. The idea is that
if liquid real assets are indeed imperfect substitutes for cash balances then we should see
significant interaction effects between asset liquidity and time only in periods of increasing
uncertainty. To see these dynamic effects, I add additional indicator variables representing
the quarters immediately before and after the uncertainty shock. Similarly, to examine
whether or not the substitution between liquid real assets and cash still holds through time,
I include interactions between the liquidity index and these indicator variables. Specifically,
I estimate the following model:
Cashi = β0 + β1HiLiq + β2After(−1) + β3After(0) + β4After(1) + β5Xi
+ β6After(−1)×HiLiq + β7After(0)×HiLiq + β8After(1)×HiLiq + ǫi. (2.6)
[Table 2.15 about here.]
Table 2.15 illustrates the effect of an uncertainty shock over a three quarter window:
one quarter before the shock, the actual event quarter, and the quarter following the shock.
The coefficients on the shock period indicator variables After(t) confirm the results in the
previous section. In general, cash holdings are not sensitive to being in the quarter before
the uncertainty shock (After(−1)). However, cash balances do tend to increase in the
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quarter in which an shock occurs (After(0)). While this finding is contrary to what is
expected, it could simply be the result of differing financial reporting dates between the
firms. Some firms may report their quarterly cash balances before the event occurs while
others report a few months afterward, so there is a possibility that there is overlapping
effects in this variable. The significance of the coefficient on After(1) shows that firms do
indeed increase their cash holdings after an uncertainty shock. This behavior is prevalent
in both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Both types of firms are sensitive
to uncertainty in the capital markets and cash balances tend to rise in the period following
a shock.
The interaction terms HiLiq × After(t) illustrate the role that liquid real assets play
in firms’ cash policies. Model (2) shows that, similar to the result in table 2.14, for the full
sample asset liquidity plays no role in the cash re-balancing behavior of the firm. Model (3)
shows that for those that are designated as financially constrained by the WW index, the
size of increases in cash balances following a shock are partially mitigated by the presence
of liquid real assets (HiLiq × After(1) is significant at the 10% level). The interaction
of HiLiq with the event quarter as well as the quarter preceding the shock event are not
significantly related to cash holdings. This provides some confirmation that the presence
of liquid real assets influences firms’ cash policies in periods of uncertainty in the capital
markets.
But as model (4) shows, this negative relationship between the size of the cash balance
increase and asset liquidity is only present within firms classified as financially constrained.
For financially unconstrained firms (as defined by the WW index), the interaction terms,
HiLiq × After(t), lack significance throughout all of the quarters surrounding the shock.
This finding indicates that firms consider their real assets as a potential source of funds
when making their their cash re-balancing decisions following a capital market shock. But
when a firm has access to other forms of external financing, the liquidity of its real assets
plays no role in it’s cash policy decisions.
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2.6 Conclusions
With asset sales comprising a non-trivial fraction of the total funds raised by firms in a given
year, the role of the potential for asset sales in the setting of corporate financial policy is
important to examine. I provide new evidence demonstrating that the liquidity of a firm’s
real assets plays a role in determining the cash management policy of the firm. Firms that
face costly access to external financing and possess assets that can potentially be liquidated
quickly and with minimal loss of value are able to treat these assets as imperfect substitutes
to holding precautionary cash balances. As a result, the presence of liquid real assets within
a firm is associated with smaller cash balances. Additionally, the value of cash holdings is
lower among firms with high asset liquidity, suggesting that the benefits of precautionary
cash balances diminishes when real assets may serve as an adequate substitute. The re-
lationship between asset liquidity and cash holdings is further illustrated by the reaction
of firms to capital market uncertainty. Immediately following an uncertainty shock, firms
tend to increase their cash balances. The magnitude of this increase is reduced, however,
for firms that possess highly liquid real assets.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregated Industry Asset Liquidity Index
The following graph plots the yearly economy wide liquidity index. The yearly economy-
wide liquidity index is computed by summing each industry liquidity index for the particular
year.
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Figure 2.2: VIX index from 1990-2012
The following graph plots the monthly VIX index reported by the Chicago Board of Options Ex-
change over the period 1990-2012. Shocks (Two standard deviation increase in the VIX within a 3
month period) are indicated by circles.
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Figure 2.3: Time Series of Cash: Constrained vs. Unconstrained
The following graphs plots the cash/assets for financial constrained firms (top graph) and for financial
unconstrained firms(bottom graph). Low asset liquidity is defined as firms ranked in the bottom
quartile of the asset liquidity index for a particular year and high asset liquidity are firms in the
top quartile. Financially constrained firms are those with an S&P credit rating of BB+ or lower or
unrated and financial unconstrained are firms with an S&P credit rating of BBB or higher. NBER
recessions are represented by gray bars.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Asset Liquidity Index
This table presents the percentile distribution of the asset liquidity index. The asset liquidity index
each year is computed as the sum of the value of industry (defined by 2 digit SIC) transactions
within a year divided by total industry book value of assets. The five year moving average of the
index is computed each year and serves as the yearly measure of the asset liquidity index.












Table 2.2: Persistence of Asset Liquidity
This table shows the correlation of the asset liquidity index over time. Each year, the asset liquidity
index is segmented into quartiles, placing the lowest liquidity industries into quartile 1 and the
highest liquidity industries into quartile 4. Liqrank takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in the 1st
quartile, 2 if in the 2nd quartile, and so on.
Liqrankt Liqrankt−1 Liqrankt−2 Liqrankt−3 Liqrankt−4 Liqrankt−5
Liqrankt 1
Liqrankt−1 0.825 1
Liqrankt−2 0.694 0.820 1
Liqrankt−3 0.588 0.690 0.819 1
Liqrankt−4 0.560 0.580 0.685 0.815 1
Liqrankt−5 0.546 0.550 0.575 0.680 0.816 1
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the each of the variables used in this study. The
variables are defined as follows: Asset Liquidity is industry level index value of liquidity computed
each year as total assets sold/total industry assets. Cash (cash + marketable securities/book value of
assets ), Size (log(total assets)), Leverage (total debt/total assets), MB (market value of equity/total
assets), Cashflow (EBIT+depreciation-taxes/total assets), CapExp (total capital expenditure/total
assets), NWC (current assets-current liabilities), Acquis (total acquisition expeditures/total assets),
RD (research and development expense/total assets), CFVol (average standard deviation of cash
flows for the industry over the past 5 years). All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Mean Median St. Dev 25% 75% N
Asset Liquidity 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.006 0.016 614377
Cash 0.177 0.084 0.215 0.022 0.256 614377
Size 4.583 4.502 2.302 2.978 6.121 614377
Leverage 0.261 0.187 0.388 0.030 0.361 614377
MB 2.491 1.469 4.132 1.074 2.364 614377
Cash Flow -0.020 0.016 0.167 -0.010 0.032 614377
CapEx 0.038 0.018 0.056 0.006 0.045 614377
NWC 0.023 0.078 0.608 -0.041 0.227 614377
Acquis 0.011 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 614377
RD 0.292 0.000 1.845 0.000 0.043 614377
CFVol 0.640 0.165 1.362 0.053 0.780 614377
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Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix
This table presents the correlations of each of the variables used in this study. The variables are defined as follows: Asset Liquidity is industry
level index value of liquidity computed each year as total assets sold/total industry assets. Cash (cash + marketable securities/book value of assets
), Size (log(total assets)), Leverage (total debt/total assets), MB (market value of equity/total assets), Cashflow (EBIT+depreciation-taxes/total
assets), CapExp (total capital expenditure/total assets), NWC (current assets-current liabilities), Acquis (total acquisition expeditures/total assets),
RD (research and development expense/total assets), CFVol (average standard deviation of cash flows for the industry over the past 5 years)
Asset Liquidity Cash Size MB Cash Flow CapEx NWC Acquis RD Leverage Dividend CFVol
Asset Liquidity 1.00
Cash -0.05 1.00
Size -0.04 -0.19 1.00
MB -0.03 0.20 -0.30 1.00
Cash Flow 0.02 -0.12 0.35 -0.59 1.00
CapEx 0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.00
NWC -0.00 -0.08 0.24 -0.61 0.61 -0.03 1.00
Acquis 0.02 -0.08 0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 1.00
RD -0.03 0.30 -0.10 0.16 -0.24 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 1.00
Leverage 0.04 -0.22 -0.13 0.41 -0.45 -0.00 -0.68 0.01 0.03 1.00
Dividend 0.02 -0.19 0.43 -0.11 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 1.00
CFVol -0.07 0.13 0.07 0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.04 1.00
Table 2.5: Summary: High Liquidity - Low Liquidity
This table presents the means of the variables used in this study segment by asset liquidity. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. Firms are classified as High Liquidity if their asset liquidity index
value is in the top 25% in a given year. Firms are classified as low liquidity if their index value is in
the bottom 25% in a given year. Difference is the difference in mean values between High Liquidity
and Low Liquidity (t-statistics in parentheses). The variables are defined as follows: Asset Liquid-
ity is industry level index value of liquidity computed each year as total assets sold/total industry
assets. Cash (cash + marketable securities/book value of assets ), Size (log(total assets)), Leverage
(total debt/total assets), MB (market value of equity/total assets), Cashflow (EBIT+depreciation-
taxes/total assets), CapExp (total capital expenditure/total assets), NWC (current assets-current
liabilities), Acquis (total acquisition expenditures/total assets), RD (research and development ex-
pense/total assets), CFVol (average standard deviation of cash flows for the industry over the past
5 years)
High Liquidity Low Liquidity Difference
Asset Liquidity 0.0271 0.005 0.023∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.003) (381.97)
Cash 0.133 0.164 -0.031∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.194) (-46.23)
Size 4.570 4.871 -0.301∗∗∗
(2.183) (2.355) (-36.93)
Leverage 0.283 0.241 0.043∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.329) (36.18)
MB 2.125 2.244 -0.120∗∗∗
(3.296) (3.451) (-9.88)
Cash Flow -0.008 -0.012 0.004∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.144) (8.43)
CapEx 0.047 0.036 0.011∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.0486) (53.15)
NWC 0.030 0.080 -0.051∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.488) (-28.83)
Acquis 0.013 0.010 0.003∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.0371) (20.95)
RD 0.108 0.166 -0.058∗∗∗
(0.994) (1.185) (-14.55)
CFVol 0.521 0.447 0.074∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.317) (16.35)
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Table 2.6: Cash Holdings by Asset Liquidity
This table presents the cash ratio for each liquidity ranking. Each year firms are ranked according
to the asset liquidity index. Firms in the bottom 25% are assigned to group 1. Firms between 25%
and 50% are assigned to group 2. Firms between 50% and 75% are assigned to group 3. Firms in the
top 25% are assigned to group 4. 4− 1 reports the difference in cash holdings between the high and
low liquidity groups. Panel A reports results over the full sample period. Panel B reports results in
the pre-Financial Crisis period, defined as all observations before 2008. Panel C reports results in
the post-Financial Crisis period, defined as 2008 and onward
Panel A: Full Sample
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 0.164 0.084 0.022 0.238 0.194 170978
2 0.208 0.105 0.026 0.317 0.238 159548
3 0.203 0.101 0.025 0.307 0.235 140758
4 0.133 0.058 0.016 0.176 0.179 143093
Total 0.177 0.084 0.022 0.256 0.215 614377
4-1 -0.031 t-stat -46.23***
Panel B: Pre Crisis
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 0.160 0.075 0.020 0.231 0.195 141940
2 0.196 0.090 0.022 0.294 0.233 126811
3 0.191 0.087 0.022 0.283 0.232 117670
4 0.137 0.058 0.016 0.183 0.183 116303
Total 0.171 0.076 0.020 0.245 0.213 502724
4-1 -0.023 t-stat -30.77***
Panel B: Post Crisis
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 0.185 0.122 0.043 0.265 0.188 29038
2 0.255 0.166 0.056 0.387 0.250 32737
3 0.264 0.183 0.063 0.409 0.245 23088
4 0.117 0.058 0.015 0.151 0.159 26790
Total 0.206 0.121 0.038 0.299 0.222 111653
4-1 -0.068 t-stat -45.83***
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Table 2.7: Non-Linear Effect of Asset Liquidity on Cash
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
Casht = β0 + β1AssetLiquidity + β2AssetLiquidity
2 + β3Xt + ǫt, where Xt is a vector of control
variables. MidLiq1 is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked between
25% and 50% in the asset liquidity index, and 0 otherwise. MidLiq2 is an indicator variable that
takes on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked between 50% and 75% in the asset liquidity index, and
0 otherwise. HiLiq is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in the top 25%
of the asset liquidity index, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include time fixed effects and industry
fixed effects. T-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.135*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.202***
(55.62) (50.97) (50.99) (48.08)
Asset Liquidity 0.0193 -0.0460 -0.145
(0.30) (-0.81) (-1.59)








Size -0.00408*** -0.00408*** -0.00408***
(-6.15) (-6.15) (-6.15)
MB 0.00743*** 0.00743*** 0.00742***
(21.09) (21.09) (21.06)
Cash Flow 0.0532*** 0.0531*** 0.0534***
(8.37) (8.36) (8.41)
CapEx -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.277***
(-23.67) (-23.68) (-23.53)
NWC -0.0838*** -0.0838*** -0.0838***
(-19.96) (-19.96) (-19.95)
Acquis -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.311***
(-35.76) (-35.76) (-35.82)
RD 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0223***
(31.19) (31.19) (30.99)
Leverage -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.236***
(-36.41) (-36.41) (-36.43)
Dividend -0.0441*** -0.0441*** -0.0440***
(-19.63) (-19.64) (-19.62)
CFVol 0.00130*** 0.00130*** 0.00110**
(2.66) (2.68) (2.30)
Rating -0.0227*** -0.0227*** -0.0227***
(-8.43) (-8.44) (-8.44)
Observations 614377 614377 614377 614377
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.340 0.340 0.341
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Table 2.8: High Asset Liquidity and Cash Holdings
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
Casht = β0 + β1HiLiq+ β3Xt + ǫt, where Xt is a vector of control variables. HiLiq is an indicator
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in the top 25% of the asset liquidity index, and 0
otherwise. Pre-Crisis designates observations before 2008. Post-Crisis, designates observations from
2008 and onward. All estimates include time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. T-statistics
computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Constant 0.137*** 0.204*** 0.215*** 0.277***
(56.13) (51.28) (53.01) (36.75)
HiLiq -0.0104*** -0.00883*** -0.00498*** -0.00545*
(-5.60) (-5.27) (-3.10) (-1.76)
Size -0.00406*** -0.00361*** -0.00385***
(-6.12) (-5.35) (-3.21)
MB 0.00743*** 0.00985*** 0.00337***
(21.10) (26.10) (7.68)
Cash Flow 0.0531*** 0.0695*** 0.0217**
(8.36) (9.30) (2.51)
CapEx -0.277*** -0.281*** -0.330***
(-23.55) (-23.79) (-12.82)
NWC -0.0837*** -0.115*** -0.0321***
(-19.95) (-24.67) (-7.09)
Acquis -0.311*** -0.271*** -0.461***
(-35.79) (-30.39) (-22.23)
RD 0.0224*** 0.0233*** 0.0184***
(31.17) (29.22) (18.58)
Leverage -0.236*** -0.292*** -0.118***
(-36.43) (-46.72) (-15.52)
Dividend -0.0441*** -0.0465*** -0.0390***
(-19.66) (-20.21) (-9.86)
CFVol 0.00131*** 0.00730*** 0.000508
(2.68) (4.21) (1.51)
Rating -0.0228*** -0.0134*** -0.0490***
(-8.46) (-4.90) (-9.94)
Observations 614377 614377 502724 111653
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.340 0.364 0.311
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Table 2.9: Asset Liquidity, Cash Holdings and Financial Constraints
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
Casht = β0 + β1HiLiq+ β2Xt + ǫt, where Xt is a vector of control variables. HiLiq is an indicator
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked in the top 25% based on the asset liquidity
index and 0 otherwise. Models 1 and 2 include firms that are in the lower 33% and upper 33% of
the WW index, respectively. Models 3 and 4 include firms that are in the lower 33% and upper
33% of the SA index, respectively. All estimates include time fixed effects and industry fixed effects.
T-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WW Unconstrained WW Constrained SA Unconstrained SA Constrained
Constant 0.278*** 0.264*** 0.203*** 0.186***
(29.82) (30.41) (20.85) (30.11)
HiLiq -0.00356 -0.0159*** -0.00436 -0.00942**
(-1.38) (-4.25) (-1.42) (-2.45)
Size -0.0106*** 0.0105*** -0.0112*** 0.0234***
(-11.22) (7.82) (-9.46) (12.50)
MB 0.0143*** 0.00590*** 0.0249*** 0.00610***
(14.68) (13.56) (16.60) (16.28)
Cash Flow 0.147*** -0.000826 -0.0148 -0.00830
(5.92) (-0.11) (-0.68) (-1.21)
CapEx -0.235*** -0.354*** -0.281*** -0.345***
(-12.04) (-17.43) (-13.43) (-18.53)
NWC -0.120*** -0.0597*** -0.224*** -0.0643***
(-11.44) (-12.01) (-22.00) (-13.83)
Acquis -0.185*** -0.523*** -0.180*** -0.492***
(-18.91) (-25.69) (-17.00) (-25.33)
RD 0.0272*** 0.0183*** 0.0651*** 0.0169***
(9.45) (25.24) (3.98) (22.75)
Leverage -0.228*** -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.191***
(-25.70) (-22.96) (-22.76) (-24.00)
Dividend -0.0371*** -0.0477*** -0.0276*** -0.0100*
(-15.40) (-8.95) (-10.44) (-1.65)
CFVol 0.000428 0.00181* 0.000327 0.00105
(0.79) (1.82) (0.57) (1.00)
Rating -0.00124 -0.0969*** -0.00590** 0.0430
(-0.49) (-12.70) (-2.19) (1.44)
Observations 187053 186969 196439 196367
Adjusted R2 0.348 0.311 0.365 0.271
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Table 2.10: Change in Cash Valuation and Real Asset Liquidity
I estimate regressions using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Regressions are estimated indepen-
dently for each subsample (High Liquidity and Low Liquidity) allowing coefficients on control variables to
vary across subsamples. Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t. dXt
is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t divided by total assets in year t((Xt −Xt−1)/At).
dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t+ 1 to year t divided by assets in year t((Xt+1 −Xt)/At).
A is the book value of assets. V is the market value of the equity plus the book value of debt. E is earnings
defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest plus deferred tax credits plus investment tax
credits. NA is net assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash. RD is research and development
expense. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. D is common dividends. C is cash,
defined as cash plus cash equivalents. T statistics are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample High Asset Liquidity Low Asset Liquidity p-value of difference
Constant 0.839*** 0.814*** 0.817*** 0.953
(21.86) (20.93) (18.10)
Et 3.373*** 4.034*** 3.324*** 0.030
(20.91) (17.26) (12.49)
dEt -0.463*** -0.681*** -0.469*** 0.159
(-6.66) (-5.65) (-4.79)
dEt+1 1.979*** 2.164*** 1.833*** 0.136
(14.16) (12.06) (11.91)
dNAt 0.288*** 0.194*** 0.330*** 0.065
(6.10) (3.39) (5.10)
dNAt+1 0.295*** 0.231*** 0.386*** 0.023
(4.70) (3.82) (5.86)
RDt 5.649*** 5.589*** 4.129*** 0.126
(12.27) (5.64) (9.94)
dRDt 2.397*** 4.229** 3.165*** 0.529
(3.23) (2.73) (4.72)
dRDt+1 6.082*** 8.890*** 5.936*** 0.085
(7.82) (5.32) (6.45)
It 1.473*** 2.503*** -0.117 0.007
(3.29) (4.93) (-0.15)
dIt -0.602 0.423 -0.628 0.205
(-1.00) (0.76) (-0.83)
dIt+1 -0.820 0.240 -3.792*** 0.004
(-1.10) (0.31) (-3.58)
Dt 3.609*** 3.441*** 3.743*** 0.653
(16.31) (8.17) (7.10)
dDt -0.814*** -1.997** -0.220 0.065
(-3.31) (-2.60) (-0.46)
dDt+1 1.096*** 0.759* 2.190*** 0.051
(5.47) (1.93) (4.34)
dVt+1 -0.166** -0.183** -0.200*** 0.710
(-2.61) (-2.55) (-4.25)
dCt 1.274*** 0.647*** 1.208*** 0.011
(5.17) (3.82) (6.47)
dCt+1 1.016*** 0.614*** 1.108*** 0.022
(5.71) (4.26) (6.17)
Observations 68198 15874 19353
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.467 0.428
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Table 2.11: Cash Valuation and Real Asset Liquidity
I estimate regressions using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Regressions are estimated indepen-
dently for each subsample (High Liquidity and Low Liquidity) allowing coefficients on control variables to
vary across subsamples. Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t. dXt
is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t divided by total assets in year t((Xt −Xt−1)/At).
dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t+ 1 to year t divided by assets in year t((Xt+1 −Xt)/At).
A is the book value of assets. V is the market value of the equity plus the book value of debt. E is earnings
defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest plus deferred tax credits plus investment tax
credits. NA is net assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash. RD is research and development
expense. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. D is common dividends. C is cash,
defined as cash plus cash equivalents. T-statistics are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample High Asset Liquidity Low Asset Liquidity p-value of difference
Constant 0.616*** 0.680*** 0.609*** 0.093
(21.71) (20.61) (16.26)
Et 3.515*** 4.036*** 3.470*** 0.064
(23.83) (17.61) (14.46)
dEt -0.411*** -0.670*** -0.397*** 0.070
(-6.42) (-5.56) (-4.29)
dEt+1 2.169*** 2.228*** 2.103*** 0.568
(13.93) (12.03) (13.03)
dNAt 0.402*** 0.294*** 0.443*** 0.014
(7.24) (5.69) (7.27)
dNAt+1 0.213*** 0.173*** 0.282*** 0.042
(3.87) (3.16) (5.44)
RDt 4.154*** 4.279*** 2.929*** 0.092
(12.41) (5.70) (8.13)
dRDt 2.911*** 4.598*** 3.243*** 0.397
(3.96) (3.06) (4.89)
dRDt+1 5.736*** 9.029*** 5.806*** 0.058
(6.29) (5.24) (5.83)
It 4.461*** 3.984*** 3.188*** 0.361
(14.40) (8.54) (5.48)
dIt -1.128* 0.185 -1.078 0.112
(-1.98) (0.32) (-1.58)
dIt+1 1.142* 1.188* -0.967 0.102
(1.76) (1.73) (-1.06)
Dt 3.412*** 3.271*** 3.642*** 0.603
(13.90) (7.49) (6.95)
dDt -0.900*** -2.001** -0.495 0.153
(-3.53) (-2.57) (-0.86)
dDt+1 1.038*** 0.744* 1.601*** 0.258
(5.30) (1.94) (2.87)
dVt+1 -0.128** -0.155** -0.152*** 0.957
(-2.13) (-2.24) (-3.40)
Ct 1.727*** 1.199*** 1.566*** 0.001
(9.26) (10.31) (12.64)
Observations 68198 15874 19353
Adjusted R2 0.430 0.477 0.434
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Table 2.12: Cash Valuation and Financial Constraints: WW Index
I estimate regressions using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Financial constrainsts are classified
according to WW index. Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t. dXt
is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t divided by total assets in year t((Xt −Xt−1)/At).
dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t+ 1 to year t divided by assets in year t((Xt+1 −Xt)/At).
A is the book value of assets. V is the market value of the equity plus the book value of debt. E is earnings
defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest plus deferred tax credits plus investment tax
credits. NA is net assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash. RD is research and development
expense. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. D is common dividends. C is cash,
defined as cash plus cash equivalents. T statistics are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unconst/HiLiq Unconst/LowLiq p-value Const/HiLiq Const/LowLiq p-value
Constant 0.520*** 0.547*** 0.437 0.946*** 0.933*** 0.758
(12.48) (15.37) (22.96) (20.76)
Et 6.701*** 5.887*** 0.062 2.546*** 1.602*** 0.010
(17.14) (17.79) (11.90) (5.68)
dEt -1.600*** -1.552*** 0.885 -0.303*** -0.113 0.229
(-6.38) (-6.16) (-2.93) (-0.94)
dEt+1 2.613*** 2.589*** 0.945 1.614*** 1.114*** 0.010
(7.40) (12.24) (13.96) (7.44)
dNAt 0.132 0.324*** 0.041 0.293*** 0.439*** 0.151
(1.64) (4.82) (4.45) (5.88)
dNAt+1 0.0442 0.274** 0.117 0.323*** 0.544*** 0.025
(0.62) (2.23) (4.51) (5.53)
RDt 4.253*** 2.275*** 0.116 4.848*** 3.131*** 0.310
(3.10) (3.16) (3.03) (7.57)
dRDt 9.085* 5.676*** 0.533 2.169 2.875*** 0.804
(1.98) (3.08) (0.76) (4.63)
dRDt+1 16.15*** 8.857*** 0.076 7.499*** 3.688*** 0.017
(3.84) (4.60) (4.75) (6.82)
It 3.782*** 0.0139 0.002 1.524** -0.0306 0.116
(5.79) (0.01) (2.54) (-0.04)
dIt 3.455** 0.662 0.194 -0.542 -0.661 0.922
(2.31) (0.50) (-0.92) (-0.62)
dIt+1 2.231* -3.414** 0.021 -0.551 -3.034** 0.170
(1.81) (-2.11) (-0.71) (-2.15)
Dt 2.882*** 3.784*** 0.418 3.156 5.427 0.568
(4.26) (3.81) (1.32) (1.26)
dDt 0.219 -0.454 0.664 -5.923 -4.316 0.786
(0.21) (-0.53) (-1.13) (-1.52)
dDt+1 2.515* 1.419 0.585 1.819 -8.153 0.187
(1.79) (1.07) (0.76) (-1.03)
dVt+1 -0.167** -0.247*** 0.350 -0.204*** -0.192*** 0.835
(-2.37) (-3.14) (-2.82) (-4.02)
dCt 0.586 0.922*** 0.412 0.817*** 1.184*** 0.037
(1.69) (3.19) (4.63) (5.42)
dCt+1 0.315 0.731** 0.259 0.782*** 1.287*** 0.090
(1.41) (2.76) (3.91) (5.35)
Observations 4781 7273 5039 5457
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.633 0.471 0.445
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Table 2.13: Cash Valuation and Financial Constraints: SA Index
I estimate regressions using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Financial constrainsts are classified
according to SA index. Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t. dXt
is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t divided by total assets in year t((Xt −Xt−1)/At).
dXt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t+ 1 to year t divided by assets in year t((Xt+1 −Xt)/At).
A is the book value of assets. V is the market value of the equity plus the book value of debt. E is earnings
defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest plus deferred tax credits plus investment tax
credits. NA is net assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash. RD is research and development
expense. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. D is common dividends. C is cash,
defined as cash plus cash equivalents. T statistics are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unconst/HiLiq Unconst/LowLiq p-value Const/HiLiq Const/LowLiq p-value
Constant 0.556*** 0.615*** 0.125 0.928*** 1.022*** 0.064
(17.97) (14.79) (19.38) (18.63)
Et 4.759*** 4.137*** 0.027 3.220*** 2.416*** 0.080
(18.32) (18.09) (9.75) (7.07)
dEt -1.052*** -0.891*** 0.406 -0.208 -0.00369 0.254
(-7.08) (-5.35) (-1.23) (-0.03)
dEt+ 1 2.197*** 1.903*** 0.154 2.147*** 1.617*** 0.099
(11.55) (11.61) (7.75) (7.09)
dNAt 0.153** 0.172** 0.813 0.417*** 0.597*** 0.250
(2.54) (2.76) (4.27) (4.87)
dNAt+1 0.0756 0.252** 0.064 0.290*** 0.462*** 0.132
(1.26) (2.68) (3.15) (4.59)
RDt 3.901*** 3.218*** 0.291 5.496*** 3.264*** 0.162
(4.78) (5.39) (3.82) (5.56)
dRDt 4.279 2.845** 0.711 7.932** 3.513*** 0.213
(1.20) (2.32) (2.21) (3.53)
dRDt+1 7.534** 6.031*** 0.670 6.841** 4.759*** 0.462
(2.38) (3.94) (2.39) (7.19)
It 5.610*** 0.655 0.000 1.789** -2.682** 0.001
(15.30) (0.59) (2.21) (-2.61)
dIt 0.786 0.281 0.672 -0.532 0.635 0.534
(0.99) (0.27) (-0.48) (0.39)
dIt+1 4.062*** -2.619 0.008 -0.385 -4.183** 0.088
(4.97) (-1.19) (-0.29) (-2.65)
Dt 6.976*** 7.904*** 0.417 3.816** 1.186 0.273
(15.26) (7.27) (2.16) (0.97)
dDt 1.060 -0.687 0.303 -4.646** -1.718 0.224
(0.67) (-0.53) (-2.11) (-1.20)
dDt+1 6.768*** 4.812** 0.511 2.782* -4.005* 0.028
(3.86) (2.38) (1.86) (-1.84)
dVt+1 -0.172** -0.256*** 0.285 -0.214*** -0.204*** 0.885
(-2.40) (-3.74) (-2.80) (-3.69)
dCt 0.314* 0.745*** 0.117 0.772*** 1.448*** 0.014
(1.92) (3.30) (3.28) (6.31)
dCt+1 -0.0303 0.611*** 0.014 0.786** 1.216*** 0.158
(-0.22) (3.03) (2.47) (5.00)
Observations 5548 8096 4383 4633
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.589 0.524 0.475
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Table 2.14: Capital Market Uncertainty
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
Casht = β0 + β1After(1) + β2HiLiq + β3HiLiq × After(1) + β4Xt + ǫt, where Xt is a vector of control variables. The coefficients for the control
variables are omitted for brevity. HiLiq is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked in the top 25% based on asset liquidity and 0
otherwise. After(1) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if an uncertainty shock occurred in that quarter and 0 otherwise. HiLiq×After(1)
is an interaction term between asset liquidity and the event dummy. Model 1 and 2 are estimated using the full sample. Models 3-6 segment the
sample into financially constrained and unconstrained firms (classified using the Whited and Wu(2006) index, and the SA index). All estimates
include time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. T-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample WW Constrained WW Unconstrained SA Constrained SA Unconstrained
Constant 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.210*** 0.186***
(50.92) (51.27) (31.51) (32.69) (23.18) (30.11)
After(1) 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 0.0149*** 0.00743*** 0.0107*** 0.00496**
(14.62) (11.86) (12.20) (3.58) (10.50) (2.39)
HiLiq -0.00883*** -0.0159*** -0.00337 -0.00911*** -0.00433
(-5.28) (-4.25) (-1.46) (-2.49) (-1.47)
HiLiq x After(1) 0.000436 -0.00506* -0.00103 -0.00131 0.00372
(0.21) (-1.91) (-0.19) (-0.59) (0.75)
Observations 614377 614377 187053 186969 196439 196367
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.340 0.312 0.349 0.273 0.366
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Table 2.15: Dynamic Effects of Capital Market Uncertainty
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
Cashi,t = β0 + β1
∑1
j=1 After(j) + β2HiLiq + β3
∑1
j=1 After(j)×HiLiq + β4Xt + ǫt, where Xt is a vector of control variables. HiLiq is a dummy
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked in the top 25% based on asset liquidity and 0 otherwise. After(t) is a dummy variable that
takes on a value of 1 if an uncertainty shock occurred t quarters ago and 0 otherwise. After(t) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if an
uncertainty shock will occur t quarters in the future. HiLiq ×After(t) is an interaction term between asset liquidity and the event dummy. Models
1 and 2 are estimated using the full sample. Models 3-6 segment the sample into financially constrained and unconstrained firms (classified using
the Whited and Wu(2006) index, and the SA index). All estimates include time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. T-statistics computed using
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level..
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample WW Constrained WW Unconstrained SA Constrained SA Unconstrained
Constant 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.264*** 0.278*** 0.186*** 0.203***
(50.92) (51.28) (30.39) (29.84) (30.11) (20.83)
After(-1) -0.00127 -0.00144 -0.00279 0.000267 -0.00424* -0.000706
(-1.63) (-1.53) (-1.32) (0.22) (-1.94) (-0.74)
After(0) 0.00206** 0.00177* -0.00290 0.00637*** -0.00417* 0.00720***
(2.39) (1.73) (-1.25) (4.59) (-1.77) (6.38)
After(1) 0.0113*** 0.0111*** 0.00642*** 0.0158*** 0.00371 0.0121***
(12.43) (10.49) (2.67) (10.80) (1.55) (10.13)
HiLiq -0.00889*** -0.0159*** -0.00283 -0.0100*** -0.00448
(-5.33) (-4.25) (-1.40) (-2.62) (-1.49)
HiLiq x After(-1) 0.000754 -0.00223 -0.00636 0.00693 -0.000670
(0.34) (-0.38) (-0.32) (1.27) (-0.30)
HiLiq x After(0) 0.00121 0.00187 -0.00852 0.00871 -0.00237
(0.55) (0.33) (-0.95) (1.64) (-1.04)
HiLiq x After(1) 0.000510 -0.00481 -0.00201 0.00427 -0.00157
(0.23) (-1.74)* (-0.25) (0.81) (-0.67)
Observations 614377 614377 186969 187053 196367 196439





Essay 2: Asset Liquidity, Cash Holdings, and the Cost of Corporate Debt
3.1 Introduction
The presence of liquid real assets (as defined as productive assets that are easily sold without
a significant loss in value) within a firm should have an impact on the credit risk of a
firm and, as a result, have an impact on the firm’s cost of the firm’s debt. As shown in
structural models of corporate liabilities (e.g. Merton, 1974; Leland, 1994; Leland and Toft,
1996, among others), in addition to the probability of default, credit spreads are directly
influenced by the creditor’s expected recovery rate in the event of default. That is, if the firm
defaults creditors will seize and sell off the firm’s assets in order to partially recover their
claims. If the ability to find a willing buyer of the firm’s assets is in fact a determinant of
the recovery value in default, then credit spreads should also be a function of asset liquidity.
Higher asset liquidity will result in greater expected recovery rates which, in turn, results
in narrower credit spreads.
While the relationship between asset liquidity and credit risk is seemingly straightfor-
ward, the existence of agency issues and managerial incentives add an additional layer of
complexity. It is true that having more liquid real assets in place provides protection for
creditors in the event of default in the sense that recovery rates are higher. But liquid assets
also give managers the flexibility to use asset sales to transform the asset composition of the
firm after debt has been issued, effectively making the existing debt more risky. Weiss and
Wruck (1998) argue that ”. . . unless a credible promise can be made not to engage in asset
stripping, [. . . ] asset liquidity [could] reduce, not increase, a firm’s ability to issue debt
securities”. The authors go on to argue that illiquid assets within the firm help to provide
such a credible promise and serve as protection from value destructing wealth transfers
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from bondholders to equityholders. Consistent with this Morellec (2001) shows that when
debt is secured by the firm’s assets, increased asset liquidity leads to a narrowing of credit
spreads. When debt is unsecured, however, asset liquidity widens yield spreads. Similarly,
Myers and Rajan (1998) demonstrate that because greater asset liquidity reduces the firm’s
ability to commit to a specific course of action, high asset liquidity may inhibit the firm’s
capacity to raise external finance through an increased cost of debt.
Also at play in the asset liquidity/credit risk relationship is the fact the firms may choose
to use asset sales as a source of financing along side debt and equity issuances (Edmans and
Mann, 2013; Arnold et al., 2014), and the trade-off between cash holdings and asset liquidity
illustrated in Essay 1 of this dissertation. In the absence of financial frictions, firms can
access external capital markets instantly at no cost to service any current liquidity needs.
Capital market imperfections, however, impose a significant cost on external financing. If
access to external finance is costly or unavailable, cash reserves provide a buffer against
negative cash flow shocks and allows firms to continue to invest in negative cash flow states
without the assistance of the capital markets. In other words, cash holdings provide firms
with financial flexibility. Here we consider an additional capital market, outside of the
traditional debt and equity markets, that firms can access in order to meet a liquidity need:
the market for asset sales. There are a number of reasons to suspect that there is a link
between the asset sale market and firms’ cash holdings. For one, if the costs of obtaining
funds from the asset sale market are reasonable, it would represent a relaxing of financing
constraints and thus would reduce the need for substantial cash reserves.
In this essay we examine each of these issues using a theoretical model, and we then
empirically test the model’s implications as well as implications posed by the existing the-
oretical literature. Specifically, we develop a simple model in which a firm can liquidate a
portion of its productive assets in order to service debt or finance investment opportunities.
Selling assets come with transaction costs that come about in two ways. The first transac-
tion cost is the discount the firm incurs on the selling price of the asset. The second cost
materializes in the loss of future cash flows from the productive asset. In order to avoid
these costs, the firm may choose to hold precautionary cash reserves. The question then be-
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comes should the firm hold precautionary cash balances or utilize options to voluntarily sell
real (productive) assets when necessary to invest in projects or service debt. In our simple,
two period model, we solve for the optimal level of asset sales and determine the impact of
the fire-sale discount on the level of cash holdings. Finally, we examine the implications of
the relationship between asset liquidity and cash holdings on the cost of corporate debt.
Empirically, we extend the corporate bond literature by examining the role of real asset
liquidity on the cost of corporate debt over a broad cross section of firms and investigate
the impact of debt covenants (i.e. secured debt vs unsecured debt) on this relationship.
In addition, motivated by the theoretical and the empirical findings of the previous essay
of this dissertation we also look at the how the interaction between cash holdings and real
asset liquidity affect corporate credit spreads.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Motives for Asset Sales
The sale of a firm’s assets has been commonly posed in the literature as a method to
resolve financial distress (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Asquith et al., 1994) as well as a
way to improve corporate efficiency and refocus on core operations (John and Ofek, 1995;
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Yang, 2008; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006). From the financial
distress viewpoint, asset sales are conducted under pressure from creditors to repay their
outstanding debt claims. In distress (i.e. when the value of the firm’s assets is less than
the face value of debt), equity holders have little incentive to engage in asset sales since
the proceeds from the sale will go almost entirely to the firm’s debt claimants (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Consistent with this notion Brown et al. (1994) find that asset sales among
distressed firm result in significantly lower return to equity holders when the sale proceeds
are used to repay debt.
Asset sales, however, need not only occur for reasons of financial distress. Voluntary
asset sales are also used frequently for the purposes of corporate restructuring and improv-
ing operating efficiency. John and Ofek (1995), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Yang
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(2008), among others show that asset sales allow firms to improve efficiency by allocating
inefficiently used resources to more productive firms. John and Ofek (1995) find that op-
erating performance tends to increase following asset sales particularly for diversified firms
which use divestitures to increase their focus. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Yang
(2008) both show that asset sale transactions are associated with productivity gains, sug-
gesting that the acquiring firm is is better able to operate the assets more efficiently. In
particular, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that nearly half of all plant re-allocations
in a given year take the form of partial-firm asset sales (as opposed to mergers). These
asset sales result in increased productive efficiency especially for multi-division firms which
sell of a peripheral division. This productivity gain is particularly large for buyer firms who
have lower productivity than the asset acquired
Moreover, asset sales can be used as a method to obtain financing for new investment.
While much of the literature studies a firm’s choice between using debt and equity financing,
obtaining financing through the sale of productive assets is also a possible alternative.
Edmans and Mann (2013) and Arnold et al. (2014) develop theoretical models in which
firms sell assets in order to finance investments. In Edmans and Mann (2013), asset sales
are treated along side other security issuance decisions and firms are permitted to use asset
sales to both raise capital for investment as well as for operational reasons. From the
pecking order argument of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms should utilize the lowest cost
source of financing, and the cheapest source of financing is the method which poses the
least amount of information asymmetry to potential financiers. Edmans and Mann (2013)
argue that there are other considerations in addition to information asymmetry that affect
the choice of financing method which lead asset sales to be preferred to equity issuances.
Specifically, they argue that because the value of new equity issuances and existing equity
are perfectly correlated, selling equity diminishes the market’s valuation of the entire firm
(Akerlof, 1970). In contrast an asset being sold, even if it is of poor quality, is not necessarily
a reflection of the quality of the firm as a whole and thus will not diminish firm value to
the same degree. The authors show that when the amount of financing needed is small or
if the firm is a conglomerate with many unrelated lines of business, financing through asset
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sales will be preferred over equity issuances.
Arnold et al. (2014) show that financing with asset sales may be optimal under certain
conditions since asset sales help to mitigate the debt overhang problem of Myers (1977).
Under equity financed investment, much of the benefits will be diverted to bondholders.
Asset sales, however, naturally increase leverage making existing debt riskier (and less
valuable). This reduction in wealth transfers from equity to debt gives rise to a preference
for financing asset sales . Since the wealth transfer problem is more prominent among highly
levered firms, they demonstrate that more levered firms have a stronger incentive to finance
through asset sales rather than equity issues. Arnold et al. (2014) also find that financing
with asset sales is more likely to occur during business cycle downturns, not because of
increased financial constraints but again due to the wealth transfer effect.
There is ample evidence in the literature to support the use of asset sales to finance
investment. Bates (2005) finds that firms that retain the proceeds from asset sales (as
opposed to payouts to bond or equity holders) tend to use those proceeds to over-invest
relative to industry benchmarks. Similarly, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Borisova
and Brown (2013) show that firms invest more when they generate cash from asset sales
and this phenomenon is particularly prevalent among financially constrained firms. Slovin
et al. (1995) and Borisova et al. (2013) find that there are significant announcement period
returns for firms that state their intention to retain the proceeds from asset sales. Hite et al.
(1987) document significant abnormal returns for both buyers and sells following voluntary
asset sales and suggest that a portion of the value gains are generated from applying the
proceeds to unfunded, positive net present value projects within the firm.
3.2.2 The Impact of Asset Liquidity on Debt Policy
The ability to sell assets for liquidation and financing purposes naturally has implications
for the claimholders of the firm, in particular the firm’s debtholders. Indeed, the agency
cost of debt arises due to the managers incentive to increase the value of equity by trans-
ferring wealth from bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One way that managers can
reallocate wealth from debt to equity is by transforming the asset composition of the firm
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into a more risky structure, the so called asset substitution problem. Because equity can
be viewed as a long position in a call option on the firm’s assets and debt a short position
in a put option, an increase in asset risk will increase (decrease) the value of equity (debt)
(Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974). Thus, an increased ability to sell assets increases
the amount of asset substitution risk the firm’s debtholders face. Myers and Rajan (1998)
argue that because an increased ability to sell assets reduces the firm’s commitment to a
particular course of action, debt capacity is diminished.
Extant research has shown that the liquidation value of the firm’s assets should be a
crucial determinant of a firm’s optimal debt policy (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Aghion and
Bolton, 1992). An asset’s liquidation value is of great importance to creditors since it repre-
sents the amount they can expect to receive if they must seize the asset from management
and sell it on the open market in order to resolve their debt claims. This liquidation value
of an asset is largely dependent on the asset’s liquidity. As described by Williamson (1988)
and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), the degree to which assets are redeployable to alternative
uses is a main determinant of an asset’s liquidity (measured as the difference between the
true value of the asset and the selling price).
Hart and Moore (1994) argues that in the presence of incomplete contracting, firms with
more liquid real assets are desirable in the eyes of creditors because they attract higher
liquidation values in the event of default. They state that “...general, nonspecific assets are
good for debt and specific or intangible assets are good for equity financing”. As such, firms
with assets which are more easily redeployed will possess larger debt capacities and longer
debt maturities, and tangible assets will facilitate borrowing only to the extent that they are
sellable. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that the concept of asset liquidity has an additional
component that goes alongside redeployability. The authors model the liquidation value of
a firm’s assets as an endogenous price that is function of both the number of potential users
of the asset as well as the financial condition of the potential users. Because assets tend
to be industry specific, a distressed firm selling assets in response to a negative industry
shock will find that the parties which value the assets the most will likely be distressed too.
If there are few firms that have use for the asset or if all potential buyers in the industry
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lack funds themselves, the demand for the asset will be low and the asset will sell at a
steep discount (likely to industry outsiders who value the assets far below their true value).
Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and Pulvino (1998) find evidence that confirms this notion that
assets that are sold to industry outsiders tend to suffer larger discounts than sales that
occur within the industry. Pulvino (1998) finds that these discounts are magnified during
economic downturns and among more financial distressed firms.
The extent to which assets may be sold is highly dependent on the laws governing the
firm in addition to the covenants attached to firm’s debt. Acharya et al. (2011) show that
the difference in leverage between a country with equity-friendly laws and a country with
debt-friendly laws is a function of the liquidation value of the firm’s assets. Firms make their
optimal continuation versus liquidation decisions on the basis of the size of their deadweight
loss in default which is in part determined by the asset liquidation value. Because equity-
friendly laws promote excessive continuation to the detriment of debtholders, higher leverage
is optimal in equity-friendly systems relative to debt-friendly systems. But as liquidation
values increase, it becomes more optimal to sell assets rather than continue excessively.
This negates the deadweight loss advantage of debt in equity-friendly countries and thus
negates the leverage disparity between the countries.
Similarly, Myers and Rajan (1998) and Morellec (2001) predict that the impact of asset
liquidity on leverage depends on whether or not the assets are posted as collateral. Because
the potential for wealth transfers due to asset stripping is higher for firms with liquid assets,
bondholders will require higher returns from these firms if their claims are not secured.
Morellec (2001) argues that asset sales are optimal for shareholders not only because they
allow the firm to allocate resources to their best use, but also because asset sales represent
the cheapest source of funds when the firm is distressed. Asset sales allow the firm to
continue operations without requiring equity injections. On the other side asset sales may be
undesirable for bondholders when their claims are unsecured because they reduce the size of
the firm upon closure thus reducing creditors’ expected recovery value in default. In general
because asset sales increase the strategy space of equityholders without giving creditors any
recourse, asset sales should have a positive relationship with the level of unsecured debt.
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Sibilkov (2009) tests these predictions and finds a multidimensional effect conditional on
the level of security place on the firm’s assets. While there is a positive relationship between
asset liquidity and secured debt, a nonlinear relation exists for unsecured debt. When asset
liquidity is at low levels, the unsecured debt is increasing with liquidity. However, when
asset liquidity is high, unsecured debt is decreasing with liquidity.
3.2.3 Asset Liquidity and Credit Risk
Asset liquidity should play a key role in structural models of corporate debt. The credit
risk of a firm can typically be decomposed into two components: the probability of default
and the recovery rate. Together, these two items give a measure of creditor’s expected
loss given default. The recovery rate represents the percentage of promised principal and
interest payments the creditor will receive in the event of a default on the firm’s debt. Often
times, an assumption is made that the recovery rate is exogenous, constant and known with
certainty in order to facilitate an analysis of the probability of default.1 However, this
assumption may not be always be appropriate. In the structural credit risk models of
Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) among others, the recovery rate is a function of
the asset value of the firm at default. If asset liquidity is heterogeneous on an industry level
as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), then recovery rates will differ among firms.
Morellec (2001) improves upon these earlier models by endogenizing asset liquidity into
the structural framework not only in regards to liquidation values in default, but also as a
key strategic variable that affects the firm’s operating policy. He shows that when debt is
secured by the firm’s assets, increased asset liquidity narrows credit spreads. When debt
is unsecured, however, asset liquidity widens yield spreads. Similarly, Myers and Rajan
(1998) demonstrate that because greater asset liquidity reduces the firm’s ability to commit
to a specific course of action, high asset liquidity may inhibit the firm’s capacity to raise
external finance through an increased cost of debt.
Empirical work linking asset liquidity to the cost of debt has been limited because it is
difficult to measure the market value of a firm’s assets prior to realizing the selling price.
1For instance, Giesecke et al. (2011) study corporate bond default rates over a 150 year period and assume
a constant recovery rate of 50%, equal to the long run historical average recovery rate.
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Thus the existing empirical literature tends to utilize small samples focusing on a particular
industry or a specific type of asset in which the true value of the asset can be either directly
observed or easily inferred (e.g. Pulvino (1998) and Gavazza (2010) examine the airline
industry, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) examine the aerospace industry, Kim (1998) looks at
the oil drilling industry, and Benmelech et al. (2005) focus on the commercial real estate
industry). In regards to the effects of asset liquidity on the pricing of corporate debt,
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) examine just secured debt among U.S. airlines. They find
that debt that is secured by collateral that is more easily transferred to other firms has lower
credit spreads. This is due to the right creditors have to seize and liquidate these secured
assets should the firm fail to service its debt properly. The more sellable the collateral, the
small the creditor’s expected losses in default.
Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014) investigate the relationship between asset liquidity and
the cost of equity over a broad cross-section of firms. They find that that the liquidity of
a firm’s real assets is negatively related to its cost of equity capital through the operating
flexibility channel. They argue that firms often have the need and desire to restructure
their operations. But if assets are illiquid, their ability to sell them when necessary is
significantly hampered. In this case, they must either forgo their desired restructuring or
else sell the assets and incur a large discount relative to the true value of the assets. It
is typically in poor economic conditions in which firms are most likely to be in need of
restructuring. Firms may want to divest their unproductive assets during these times, but
if the cost of selling their real assets is high they may be forced to continue operating them.
Therefore possessing illiquid real assets increases the covariance of firm performance with
macroeconomic conditions and thus increases the firm’s cost of equity.
3.2.4 The Relationship Between Cash Holdings and Asset Liquidity
Central to the literature on corporate cash holdings are financial constraints. If external
financing could be accessed easily and costlessly, there would be no role for cash holdings
as firms could simply issue securities whenever funds were needed. But with financial
constraints, cash holdings become an integral component of corporate financial policy. Kim
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et al. (1998) develop a three period model and show that cash accumulation is increasing
in the cost of external finance, the variance of future cash flows, and the return on future
investment opportunities, but decreasing in the return differential between physical capital
and cash.
Han and Qiu (2007) find that the uncertainty of future cash flows and financing con-
straints give rise to precautionary cash holdings. In their model, financially unconstrained
firms have unrestricted access to external financing and are able to make first-best in-
vestments regardless of the size of future cash flows. Constrained firms have no external
financing, however, and must make an intertemporal trade-off between the size of current
and future investment. Since an increase in cash flow volatility increases the expected
marginal return on future investment, constrained firms will save more cash. There is no
such relationship between cash flow volatility and cash holdings for the unconstrained firms.
Along similar lines, Riddick and Whited (2009) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) use
dynamic models of the firm to show that income uncertainty and costly external financing
leads to higher precautionary cash holdings. Riddick and Whited (2009)) focuses on the
accumulation of cash over time and thus allows for capital adjustments. They find that as
capital becomes more productive and cash flows become larger the firm substitutes its cash
reserves to purchase additional capital, leading to a negative relationship between savings
and cash flows. Acharya et al. (2007) illustrate the hedging component of precautionary
cash holdings. They show that when firms are financially constrained and their investment
opportunities tend occur in states when cash flows are low, firms hedge this risk by saving
more cash. For firms with a positive relationship between investment opportunities and
cash flows, cash is used to pay debt rather than saved.
The empirical literature confirms many of these predictions found in these models. Opler
et al. (1999), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al.
(2004) all find that cash holdings are increasing in the degree of external financing con-
straints. Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) find a positive relationship between cash
and measures of cash flow risk and investment opportunities.
Bolton et al. (2011) relate the cash holdings decision to the asset sale decision by consid-
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ering the idea that the firm may want to engage in asset sales in order to replenish its stock
of cash and avoid liquidity defaults. In their model, asset sales are excessively costly both
because of underinvestment and physical adjustment costs. Nevertheless, the model shows
that when the firm’s cash reserves are low, the firm will engage in asset sales to raise cash
and move away from the liquidity default boundary. Even when costly equity issuances are
possible, they show that asset sales are still feasible when cash balances become depleted.
Warusawitharana (2008) shows that the level of liquid assets on a firm’s balance strongly
impacts the choice of a firm to sell assets. He finds that a one standard deviation increase
in cash holdings increases the odds that the firm will sell assets by 32%. Additionally, the
quantity of assets sold depends on the marginal value of capital inside the firm (marginal
Q). That is to say less profitable firms with fewer growth opportunities tend to sell a
larger quantity of assets. This finding corresponds with financing hypothesis of asset sales
put forth by Lang et al. (1995). They argue that firms sell assets to generate funds to
pursue its objectives when other sources of funding are either unavailable or too expensive.
They find that firms close to financial distress tend to sell assets to raise funds, which
provides confirmation of this hypothesis. Similarly, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) find
that the sensitivity of investment to asset sale proceeds is related to variables that coincide
with financial constraints. That is, younger, unrated, non-dividend payers have a higher
sensitivity of investment to asset sale proceeds. Bates (2005) provides additional evidence
that asset sales can be used to bypass other methods of financing, especially when other
avenues are costly or unavailable. He examines 400 large asset sale transactions and finds
that proceeds retention is positively related to the selling firm’s growth opportunities and
post-sale investment.
3.2.5 The Role of Cash in Credit Risk Models
The ability to costlessly sell equity eliminates the role of precautionary cash holdings in
determining financial policy and the value of corporate securities. In the structural credit
risk models with endogenous default such as those developed by Black and Cox (1976),
Geske (1979), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), He and Xiong (2012), among others,
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the default boundary arises as an optimal decision made by the shareholders. In the Geske
(1979) model, if the value of assets is sufficiently high, then the value of equity is non-zero.
Equity holders will issue new equity in order to continue servicing their debt as long as the
value of equity equals the value of the future cash flows. Similarly in Leland (1994) and
Leland and Toft (1996), shareholders optimally choose a default boundary which maximizes
the value of equity. If debt obligations can not be covered by internal cash flows, equity
holders will contribute the necessary funds to fill the shortfall as long as the marginal value
of equity is positive. In each of these models if capital markets are frictionless and there
are no costs to issuing equity, then there will be no need for a firm to hold cash reserves to
hedge such occasions.
Acharya et al. (2012) develop a model in which they restrict access to external financing
and thus introduce a role for cash holdings in the context of credit risk. Because default
is costly, firms hold precautionary cash balances in order to hedge cash flow risk and avoid
default. In their three period model, the firm makes a choice between investing in cash
versus investing in a long-term project. Increasing investment in the project results in
higher payoffs conditional on not defaulting. Retaining cash reduces the payoff from the
long-term project but increases the likelihood of survival. The optimal level of cash holdings
is found by choosing the level of investment the maximizes the value of equity.
3.2.6 Contribution
Here, we develop model that is similar in spirit and set up to Acharya et al. (2012). However,
we introduce a few key distinctions to evaluate the role of asset sales on the relationship
between cash holdings and credit risk. First while Acharya et al. (2012) consider only a
single investment opportunity, we introduce a second investment opportunity to generate
a second motive for holding cash in addition to simply avoiding default. By holding large
cash balances today the firm is increasing their likelihood of survival (i.e. by making the
necessary debt payments). But at the same time, they are reducing their outlays in both
current and future investment. Second while we assume that the firm does not have access
to debt or equity markets, they do have the ability to liquidate their assets in place (at
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a cost that is a function of the asset’s liquidity) to generate funds for debt service and
investment. Also, contrary to the literature on the pricing of risky debt in which the level
of assets sales is exogenous (i.e. Leland, 1994), our model assumes that the quantity of
assets sold is determined endogenously.
Empirically, our work is related to recent work exploring the role of real asset liquidity on
firm characteristics (e.g Pulvino, 1998; Ramey and Shapiro, 2001; Benmelech and Bergman,
2009). These studies, however, are limited in the ability to make broad conclusions as they
focus their attention on a small number of firms in a particular industry. There are two
key exceptions to these small sample studies. Sibilkov (2009) and Ortiz-Molina and Phillips
(2014) both use measures of asset liquidity similar to the one I propose here which allow them
to investigate the role of real asset liquidity over a broad cross-section of firms. However,
while Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014) investigate the role of asset liquidity on the cost of
equity capital, we examine its role on the pricing of corporate debt.
3.3 Basic Model
3.3.1 Introduction
Our theoretical argument can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings are a zero NPV
investment. Therefore it would benefit the firm to direct funds away from cash reserves
and into more productive investments. The existence of debt service requirements, future
investment opportunities, and restricted access to capital markets gives rise to a precau-
tionary motive for cash holdings. If asset sales are permitted, however, the firm has the
option to liquidate its real assets in order to meet its liquidity needs. Therefore, asset sales
and cash holdings are substitutes, i.e. with permissible asset sales, firms will hold smaller
cash balances. This follows directly from asset sales acting as a means of reducing financing
constraint. The degree to which asset sales reduce financial constraints and subsequently
reduce the size of cash balances will depend on the liquidation cost of asset. When sold at a
fire sale price, the disparity between the selling price and true value of the asset represents a
substantial cost to accessing the asset sale market. Therefore asset sales will be decreasing
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and cash holdings increasing with the cost of liquidation.
The implications of the the expected liquidation cost on the asset sale / cash holdings
relationship will play a key role in the pricing of the firm’s bonds. As cash balances provide
debt holders with additional assurances that their claims will be repaid, asset sales will
reduce the potential recovery value for creditors in the event of default. The selling price
of the firm’s assets will a determining factor in the level of cash the firm will choose to hold
and simultaneously affect the level of asset sales the firm will choose to engage in. Both
of these actions will have an impact on the expected payoff to creditors and thus impact
the cost of corporate debt. With the proposed model we will detail these relationships and
derive testable empirical implications.
3.3.2 Assumptions
We consider a two period model of firm’s investments vis-a-vis financing decisions when asset
sales are permissible. The firm i has real assets in place which can be liquidated in a timely
fashion at any time t for a price of At. However, a fire-sale would demand a discount. We
assume that the fire-sale price, At(η), is a direct function of percentage of assets liquidated,
η, and that while the liquidation value is decreasing function of liquidation percentage,
that is, ∂At(η)/∂η < 0, the decrease decelerates as the percentage liquidated increases, or,
∂2At(η)/∂η
2 ≥ 0. We assume that the selling price is a linear function of percentage assets
liquidated and the liquidity of the asset market, whereby At(η, α) = At − (1 − α)Atη =
At(1 − (1 − α)η). α ∈ [0, 1] can be viewed as the liquidity of asset market in that α = 1
denotes an infinitely liquid market in which the percentage of liquidation has no bearing on
selling price of the asset. α = 0 denotes an illiquid market in which full liquidation leads to
a selling price of zero. With any other value of α, at full liquidation, the liquidation price
is αAt.
Figure 3.1 provides a simple illustration of this linear pricing function. In this example,
the true value of the asset is $100 per unit. When α = 1, that is when market for the firm’s
assets are very liquid, the selling price will equal the true value no matter the quantity sold.
If α = 0.6, the assets will yield a price of $60 per unit in full liquidation and $80 per unit
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if the firm sells 50% of its assets. In the extreme case where α = 0 which represents a very
illiquid market for the firm’s assets, full liquidation leads to a selling price of $0 per unit
and selling 50% of its assets yields a selling price of $50 per unit.
[Figure 3.1 about here.]
The firm’s real assets generate a sequence of cash flows of x0, x̃1, x2 at times t = {0, 1, 2}.
From this sequence, only x̃1 is random. We consider two cases where x̃1 is distributed: (1)
uniformly, x̃1 ∼ U [x, x], and (2) normally, x̃1 ∼ Φ[µx, σx]. We assume that a firm undertakes
an investment project at t = 0 by outlaying I0 in return for receiving a sure payoff of f(I0)
at time t2. At time t = 0, the firm issues bonds with face value B which is due at time
t = 1. At time t = 0, the firm and bondholders agree on permissible level of asset sales.
Thus at t = 0, the firm must decide how much cash, c, to hold. At time t = 1, the firm has
the opportunity to expand by investing I1 amount in a project which yields g(I1) at time
t = 2. For simplicity, as in Acharya et al. (2012), we also assume that the risk-free interest
rate is zero and investors are risk-neutral.
3.3.3 The Model
Consider the case of an expansion project in which after repaying debt, residual resources
(cash holdings and incoming cash flows) plus full liquidation asset value are not large enough
to afford the initial outlay of the project. In an intuitive sense, in the presence of such an
expansion project, asset sales are not large enough to simply bifurcate states of nature over
a set where investment is paid with asset sales and another set where asset sales prevents
default. With expansion, there exists a set of states of nature that despite not defaulting,
the firm cannot undertake the investment. To elucidate this situation, we now explore such
a case in which there are five possible states of nature the firm can face at t = 2. Here we
present each state and the payoff outcomes for both equity holders and bond holders.
State 1 c+ x̃1 ≥ B and c+ x̃1 −B ≥ I1
The cash flow received at t = 1 in addition to cash holdings is sufficient to to repay
debt, as well as undertake the expansion project without asset sales. At t = 1,
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equityholders (i.e., the firm) will fully repay the bondholders and invest I1 to expand.
Bondholders will receive the full par value of their claim, B. At t = 2, equityholders
will receive total cash flows of f(I0) + x2 +A2 + g(I1) + c+ x̃1 −B − I1.
State 2 c+ x̃1 ≥ B and c+ x̃1 −B < I1
The cash flow received at t = 1 in addition to cash holdings is sufficient to to repay
debt, but not sufficient enough to undertake the expansion project. However, there
exists a unique percentage of assets liquidated, η∗, at which the proceeds from a
liquidation, A(η∗), is equal to the investment shortfall, I1 − |c+ x̃1 −B|.
At t = 1, the firm will fully repay bondholders. But the firms sells η∗ percentage of
assets to invest I1 for expansion. Bondholders receive the full par value of their claim,
B. At t = 2, equityholders receive total cash flows of (1−η∗) [f(I0) + x2 +A2]+g(I2).2
State 3 c+ x̃1 ≥ B and c+ x̃1 −B < I1
Cash flows received at t = 1 in addition to cash holdings are sufficient to repay debt.
However, there does not exist any percentage of assets liquidated, ηI , at which the
proceeds from asset sales, A(η∗), is equal to the shortage needed to invest and expand,
I1 − |c+ x̃1 −B|.
At t = 1, the firm fully repays bondholders and forgoes the expansion project. Bond-
holders will receive the full par value, B. At t = 2, equityholders will receive total
cash flows of f(I0) + x2 +A2.
State 4 c+ x̃1 < B
Cash flows received at t = 1 in addition to cash holdings are insufficient to fully repay
bondholders. Additionally, there does not exist any percentage assets liquidated, η∗,
at which the proceeds from liquidation, A(η∗), is enough to undertake the expansion.
Even at full liquidation, asset sale proceed are less than what is necessary to invest
and expand: A(η = 1) < I1 − |c + x̃1 − B|. However, there does exist a unique
percentage assets liquidated, η†, at which the proceeds from a liquidation, A(η†), is
2It is noteworthy that η∗ is a function of x̃1 and can be solved for via A(η
∗) ≡ A1(1 − (1 − α)η
∗) =
I1 − |c+ x̃1 −B|.
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equal to what is needed to fully pay the bondholders, B − c− x̃1.
At t = 1, the firms sells η† percentage of assets in order to fully repay bondholders.
Bondholders receive the full par value, B and at t = 2, equityholders receive total
cash flows of (1− η†) [f(I0) + x2 +A2].3
State 5 c+ x̃1 < B
Cash flows received at t = 1 in addition to cash holdings are insufficient to repay
creditors. Moreover, there does not exist any percentage assets liquidated, η†, at
which the proceeds from asset sales, A(η†), is equal to what is needed to fully repay
the bondholders, B − c− x̃1.
At t = 1, the firm defaults and bondholders take over the firm. Bondholders force full
liquidation and receive c+ x̃1 +A(η = 1). Equity holders receive a payoff of zero.
Pricing of Debt and Equity Claims
To price equity and debt claims, we need to find the risk-neutral expected payoff of each
claim. We first derive the debt claim value since given the above states, only under state











[c+ x̃1 +A(η = 1)]Pr[x̃1 < B − c−A(η = 1)] dx̃1. (3.1)
Equation 3.1 has two parts: 1) the repayment of the face value conditioned on using both
cash holdings and liquidating assets, and 2) receiving cash holdings, the cash flow at t = 1,
and the asset value at full liquidation upon default. With the assumption that cash flows
(or alternativly, cash flow shocks) are uniformly distributed, x̃1 ∼ U [x, x], we can rewrite
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Since with η fractional asset liquidation, the asset value at liquidation is given by A(η)1 =
(1−(1−α)η)A1 where α is the discount per dollar liquidated, we know that A(η = 1) ≡ αA1,
and thus we can find the value of debt as
D =
x̄+ c+ αA1 −B
x− x
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Because the debt is a discount bond and investors are risk neutral, the corporate yield
spread is given by s = B
D
− 1.
Aggregating the cash flows over each of the five possible states of nature, the value of





















(1− η†)[f(I0) + x2 +A2]
]
Pr[B − c−A(η = 1) ≤ x̃1 < B − c] dx̃1. (3.5)
As noted, in state 2, the firm liquidates η∗ fraction of assets so as to raise enough funds
to undertake the expansion project. This necessitates that A(η∗) = I1 − |c + x̃1 − B|.
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Similarly, in state 4, the firm liquidates η† fraction of assets so as to raise enough funds
to undertake the expansion project. This necessitates that A(η†) = B − c− x̃1. Replacing
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Substituting the above values of η∗ and η† as well as the identity A(η = 1) ≡ αA1 into
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×
× Pr[B − c− αA1 ≤ x̃1 < B − c] dx̃1. (3.6)
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Equation 3.8 represents three components. First, the expectation of receiving f(I0)
proceeds from investing I0, the terminal asset value A2, and the terminal cash flow, x2,
conditional on the probability that firm does not default. To avoid default, the firm utilizes
cash flows, cash holdings, and even partial asset sales. Second, the expectation of receiving
g(I1) proceeds from investing I1 conditional on the probability that firm does not default
and is able to undertake the investment at t = 1. And third, the conditional volatility of
cash flows in excess of debt repayment and investment outlay in presence of cash holdings.
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Optimal Cash Holdings







− x+B − c− αA1
]
(3.9)
This implies that from the bondholder’s perspective, the optimal cash holding, c∗ = B −
αA1 − x, is equal to the par value minus the combined full liquidation asset value and
the minimum cash flow. This reflects a desire to fully hedge the business risk that the
bondholders are exposed to using the firm’s cash holdings. Obviously from equityholders
point of view this can be much too excessive since it forces the firm to set aside resources
that could otherwise be deployed towards profitable investment projects. Assuming that
managers are working to maximize shareholder value, the firm will choose the level of cash
holdings that maximizes the value of equity given in equation 3.8.
Proposition 1 Consider the case of an expansion project whereby even if all resources on
hand (both cash and asset sales) are utilized, there would be states of nature in which the firm
would not default but still be forced to forgo expansion. Then assuming that profit functions
f and g are linear functions of initial investments, that is, f(I0) = β0I0 and g(I1) = β1I1,











Optimal cash holdings, c∗:
• is an increasing function of cash flows at t = 0 and t = 2 (i.e., x0, x2), asset value
at t = 2, A2, the size of the expansion outlay, I1, the profitability of the expansion
project, β1, and par value of the bond, B; and a decreasing function of the maximum
cash flow, x.
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• is a decreasing (increasing) function of initial investment’s profitability, β0, when
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Proof. Substituting I0 for x0−c, we can then take the derivative of equation 3.8 with respect





























Substituting ∂I0/∂c = −1, ∂f(I0)/∂I0 = β0, g(I1) = β1I1, and, I0 = x0 − c, we then
have




It is trivial to show that by re-arranging the above, we arrive at equation 3.10. To arrive
at the comparative statics, we take partial derivative of above equation with respect to
the appropriate variable. ∂c/∂x0 = β0/(2β0 − 1) > 0 because β ≥ 1. ∂c/∂x2 = ∂c/∂A2 =
1/(2β0−1) > 0. Additionally, ∂c/∂I1 = (β1−1)/(2β0−1) ≥ 0 and ∂c/∂β1 = I1/(2β0−1) >








The first term is always positive since β0 ≥ 1. In the second term, the denominator is
always positive for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Since the roots of the numerator in the second term are zero
and 12 , then we can show that for 0 ≤ α <
1
2 , the numerator is positive making ∂c/∂A1
positive. For 12 ≤ α < 1, ∂c/∂A1 is then negative.
















Since 0 ≤ α < 1, only α = 1− 1√
2
is relevant which then implies that when 0 ≤ α < 1− 1√
2
,
∂c/∂α is positive and negative otherwise.
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Credit Spreads, Optimal Cash Holdings, and Asset Liquidity
By substituting the optimal level of cash holding from equation 3.10 into equation 3.4, we
can arrive at a closed-form expression for the bond value. We first compute the optimal level
of cash holdings (i.e. the level which maximizes the value of equity) and then determine
the credit spread at this optimized level of cash holdings. The closed form expression
is rather unwieldy and complex. Therefore, to facilitate the intuition we illustrate the
comparative statics of the credit spread, s =
B
D
− 1, with respect to firm and asset sale
market conditions graphically. We consider a baseline case where x0 = 10, x1 ∼ U [20, 10],
and, x2 = 20. Additionally, B = 150, I0 = 100, and, I1 = 120. Moreover, f(I0) = β0 I0,
where, β0 = 1.3 and g(I1) = β1 I1, where, β1 = 1.5. Figures 3.2 to 3.5 illustrate some
of the comparative statics of the model. In each, we examine the relationship between
asset liquidity and credit spreads for while varying different parameters of the model. In
particular we vary the degree of initial leverage (B), the profitability of the project (β0).
A consistent feature in each figure is a convex relationship between the liquidity of the
firm’s assets and credit spreads. For low levels of liquidity, an increase in asset liquidity, α,
is associated with a lowering of credit spreads. But for higher levels of asset liquidity, the
relationship reverses. At high levels of asset liquidity, increasing α results in a widening of
credit spreads. This finding is consistent with the argument put forth by Myers and Rajan
(1998) in which managers will not sell assets to expropriate wealth from bondholders if they
gain little compared to the benefits the gaining from operating the assets. If the costs of
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transferring wealth from bondholders by way of asset sales is too high (as measured by α),
then managers will chose not to do so. Therefore the creditor’s claims to the assets are
protected from expropriation even when the debt is unsecured. When the cost of asset sales
is low (i.e. α is large), selling assets to expropriate wealth from bondholders becomes more
attractive. Thus creditors compensate for this possibility ex-ante by increasing the cost of
debt and widening credit spreads.
In figure 3.2 we vary the face value of debt, B, to show the effects of leverage on the asset
liquidity-credit spread relationship. Because the size of the expansion project is constant,
varying the face value of debt is analogous to varying the firm’s leverage ratio. Figure 3.2
shows that while this convex relationship exists across a wide range of leverage ratios, it
is most apparent among high leverage firms. And it is among these high leverage firms
in which the threat and degree of wealth expropriation from bond holders is the highest
(Maxwell and Rao, 2003; Maxwell and Stephens, 2003).
[Figure 3.2 about here.]
Figure 3.3 illustrates the asset liquidity-credit spread relationship while varying the prof-
itability of the initial investment opportunity, β0. In general, credit spreads are increasing
with the project’s profitability. When the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunity
is high the firm has an incentive to investment more funds into the project and hold less
cash, this leaving less protection for the bondholders. We can see that at lower levels of prof-
itability, the relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads becomes flatter. This is
precisely because these firms with less profitable investments will hold more cash and thus
the likelihood and intensity of asset sales will be less. As such, the cost of assets sales will
have minimal impact on the bondholder’s claims. Conversely for firms with more profitable
initial investment opportunities, funds will be diverted away from cash and into the project
and as a result the intensity and likelihood of asset sales will be greater. Therefore the
firm’s creditors must consider the impact the asset sales on their claims and increase the
price of debt ex-ante. This results in a large disparity in the credit spreads between low
and high profitability firms in the high liquidity regions where wealth expropriating asset
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sales are likely to take place.
[Figure 3.3 about here.]
Intuitively if the expected cash flows to the firm are higher, the firm will be less likely
to default. Therefore credit spreads will be decreasing with the size of expected cash flows.
Figure 3.4 illustrates this simple and intuitive relationship by varying the expected size of
the uncertain cash flow at time 1, E[x1]. We can see that at all levels of asset liquidity,
credit spreads a lower for firms with higher expected cash flow size. But similar to figure
3.3, the disparity in credit spreads between low and high average cash flow firms widens
substantially in the high asset liquidity regions. This occurs because firms with low cash
flows and high asset liquidity are more likely to undertake asset sales in order to fund
future investment opportunities, to the detriment of the bond holders. Additionally, the
scale of these asset sales will be larger among the firms with lower expected cash flows since
there would be a larger financing gap. Because the likelihood and degree of asset sales will
be greater for firms with low expected cash flows, the bond holders will require greater
compensation to offset the probable wealth transfers.
[Figure 3.4 about here.]
Figure 3.5 varies the range of the uncertain cash flow at time 1 (i.e. x−x) to demonstrate
the impact of cash flow volatility on the asset liquidity-credit spread relationship. When
cash flows are more volatile, it is more likely to have a cash shortfall leading to financial
distress or default. Consistent with this logic, Minton and Schrand (1999), Molina (2005),
and Tang and Yan (2010) each find that credit spreads are generally increasing with the
volatility of the firm’s cash flows. In our model, however, this relationship only holds
partially. In the lower liquidity regions, we do indeed see that firms with more cash flow
volatility have higher credit spreads. This pattern flips in the high asset liquidity regions,
with firms with more cash flow volatility having smaller credit spreads.




The following hypotheses are motivated by the comparative statics results illustrated in the
previous section as well as results developed in the extant literature.
From the perspective of structural credit risk models (e.g. Merton, 1974; Black and Cox,
1976), the value of assets only serves to determine the probability of default as well as the
recovery value given default. When firms may choose to voluntarily sell assets, however,
the selling price potentially has an impact on optimal firm behavior.
Myers and Rajan (1998) suggest that when debt is unsecured, greater asset liquidity
makes it less costly for managers to sell firm assets, change the risk of the firm, and ex-
propriate value from creditors. Although managers have the ability to sell assets at any
level of liquidity, they will choose not to do so when liquidity is low. If the transaction
cost incurred while selling the illiquid asset is greater than the benefits the equityholders
would receive by simply operating the assets, managers would prefer to forgo asset sales.
Therefore, unsecured debt of firms with low asset liquidity will behave similarly to secured
debt in the sense that managers are constrained in the ability to expropriate wealth through
asset sales. When asset liquidity is high, transaction costs associated with selling assets are
reduced, giving managers a greater incentive to transform the firm’s asset composition and
expropriate wealth from bondholders.
The general non-linear shape of figures 3.2 to 3.5 demonstrates this idea as well. For
low levels of asset liquidity, credit spreads are decreasing with liquidity. However for higher
level of liquidity, spreads are increasing with asset liquidity.
Hypothesis 1 There will exist a non-linear relationship between asset liquidity and credit
spreads such that for low levels of asset liquidity credit spreads are decreasing with liquidity,
and for higher level of liquidity credit spreads are increasing with asset liquidity.
Figure 3.2 suggests that while the relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads
is somewhat flat at lower levels of leverage, at high leverage a convex relationship becomes
apparent. This effect arises because the threat and degree of wealth expropriation is higher
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among firms with high leverage. Consistent with this idea, Maxwell and Rao (2003) find that
following a spin-off announcement bondholders suffer significant losses partially through the
loss of coinsurance. If the cash flows generated from a firm’s assets are not perfectly corre-
lated, then a sale of assets increases the bondholder’s risk and make his claims less valuable.
The authors find evidence that the magnitude of these bondholder losses is amplified as the
firms become more highly levered and these losses are transferred to equityholders. Thus
as assets become more easily sold, bondholders of high leverage firms will be more exposed
to potential losses and thus require additional compensation for this risk.
Hypothesis 2 The relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads will be stronger
among high leverage firms
The comparative statics analysis of the model suggests that firms with large growth
opportunities will exhibit a stronger relationship between real asset liquidity and credit
spreads. Equation 3.3 shows that when the profitability of the expansion project is low, the
relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads is relatively flat. When the expansion
project becomes more profitable, however, a U-shaped pattern becomes apparent.
The literature has shown that asset sales are related to investment opportunities (e.g.
Bates, 2005; Borisova and Brown, 2013). Bates (2005) shows that firms are more likely to
retain the proceeds from an asset sale rather than make payoffs to claimholders when they
have large growth opportunities. Firms with better growth opportunities will be more likely
to sell off their assets to fund investments. If the proceeds generated from selling existing
assets are used to fund more risky investment opportunities, then there will be a transfer
of wealth from debtholders to equityholders.
For firms with less profitable growth opportunities, selling assets to finance investment
may not be worthwhile at any level of liquidity due to the costs associated with asset sales.
The additional cash flows generated from the expansion are not sufficiently large enough
to greatly outweigh the costs of asset sales. Therefore, creditors’ payoffs are unaffected
by the presence of growth opportunities. For more profitable projects, asset sales become
more feasible to finance investment. But the costs of asset sales are so high at low levels
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of liquidity that the firm will choose not to expand, leaving bondholder payoffs unaffected.
At higher levels of liquidity the firm may choose to sell assets to expand and, as a result,
creditors become more exposed to potential losses. Creditors will demand compensation for
this risk ex-ante in the form of wider credit spreads.
Hypothesis 3 The relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads with be stronger
among firms with larger growth opportunities.
When the debt is secured, the firm’s creditors do not face the threat of asset substitution.
Because their claims are explicitly backed by the assets of the firm, wealth transfers from
debtholders to equityholders by way of asset sales are prohibited. Because the agency
problems related to asset sales are contractually restricted for secured debt, holders of this
debt should only consider their expected loss given default when valuing their claims. In
default, secured bondholders will be able to seize the firm’s assets when they default on their
obligations. Since the value of the firm’s assets in default is partially determined by the
ability to locate a willing and able buyer, the liquidity of the assets effects the bondholder’s
recovery value in default. Firms with higher asset liquidity will have higher recovery values
and thus require a lower yield on their investment.
Hypothesis 4 For secured debt and debt with covenants restricting asset sales, credit
spreads will be negatively related to real asset liquidity
Myers and Rajan (1998) and Morellec (2001) suggest that there is a negative relationship
between the liquidity of a firm’s assets and their credit spread when the debtholders claims
are secured. This results because the higher the liquidity of the firm’s real assets, the higher
the market price during liquidation. Thus for firms with liquid real assets, in the event of
default the recovery value to creditors will be greater. Morellec (2001) shows that when
debt is unsecured, high asset liquidity allows the firm to use asset sales to increase the
operating flexibility of the firm to the detriment of the firm’s creditors. This results in a
widening of spreads.
Acharya et al. (2012) demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between cash
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holdings and credit spreads.4 This arises due to the certainty effect of cash. With more
cash on the balance sheet, the firm becomes more able to service its debt and as a result
the probability of default as well as credit spreads decrease.
Finally, in the first essay of this dissertation I document a negative empirical relationship
between cash holdings and asset liquidity. These three facts suggest that that an endogenous
relationship exists between these three items: cash, asset liquidity, and credit spreads. The
main issue is summarized graphically in figure 3.6.
[Figure 3.6 about here.]
All else equal, a firm with a high degree of liquid real assets will have larger credit
spreads. However, it is not the case that all else is equal. Firms with liquid real assets tend
to hold less cash and the impact of lower cash holdings is an increase in credit spreads. If
highly liquid assets are accompanied by large cash balances, the credit spread increasing
impact of asset liquidity will be diminished.
Hypothesis 5 The positive relationship between asset liquidity and credit spreads is reduced
with higher cash holdings.
3.4.2 Data
In this section, I briefly describe the data sources and variable construction. Firm-level
accounting and stock price information are gathered from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the
1996-2013 time period. All accounting data from COMPUSTAT is winsorized at the 1%
and 99% level to control for potential outliers and reporting errors. Merger and acquisition
data is obtained from Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum. We exclude financial firms (SIC
codes 6000 - 6999).
Bond Data
Daily corporate bond yields for the period of 1994 to 2005 are obtained from transaction
prices reported in the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). FISD reports
4Using basic OLS regressions they actually find a positive relationship, but after addressing the endoge-
nous relation between credit risk and the choice of cash holdings with instrumental variables and identifying
the effect ’pure’ cash holdings on credit spreads, they observe a negative relationship.
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transaction data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and
therefore only trades conducted by insurance companies are included. While insurance
companies are the most prominent investors in corporate bonds (Campbell and Taksler,
2003), I supplement the FISD data with transactions reported to the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine (TRACE) provided by FINRA.5 Introduced in 2002, TRACE reports
tick-by-tick transaction data for all US corporate bonds and as of 2005 approximately 99%
of all public bond transactions are reported.
I delete erroneous bond prices by removing transactions conducted at prices greater
than $220 (per $100 par) and less than $25 (per $100 par).6 Additionally, I implement the
algorithm of Dick-Nielsen (2009) to filter reporting errors (i.e canceled trades, corrections,
reversals, etc.). Additionally, I remove bonds with less than one year and greater than 30
years until maturity. Finally, following the methodology of Bessembinder et al. (2009), I
eliminate trades of less than $100,000 and convert intra-day yields into daily yields using a
trade-size weighted average. The resulting combination of FISD and TRACE transactions
results in a total of 3,397,682 daily transactions. I take the average of the daily yields
within the month to obtain monthly bond yields. To ensure homogeneity among the bonds
in the sample I exclude all bonds with option-like features (convertibles, putable, callable,
and floating rate bonds), non US firms, and bonds denominated in foreign currencies. After
merging with COMPUSTAT and FISD bond characteristic data and covenant information,
I am left with 34,041 firm-month bond yields.7 I consider a bond to be secured if the issue
contains an ’SS’ flag in FISD. Similarly, I consider a firm to have covenants restricting or
limiting asset sales if the ”Sale Assets” flag takes on a value of yes.8
I compute the credit spread, CSPRD as the difference between the corporate bond
5Insurance companies hold about 25% of corporate bonds in the US market from 2004 to 2012.See:http:
//www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/140307.htm
6Asquith et al. (2013) considers $220 the maximum price for a risk-free bond and thus prices greater
must be errors in reporting. Similarly, Ederington et al. (2012) consider prices of less than $25 to either be
errors or defaulted bonds.
7Firm-month observations with an S&P credit rating of D or with a credit spread greater than 40% are
also deleted. This filter removes 215 observations (158 removed due to credit rating, 57 removed due to
credit spread).
8Surprisingly, very few bond issues contained in FISD report either bonds as secured or containing asset
sale covenants. On 1489 observations explicitly contain restrictions on asset sales, 10,543 explicitly report
no covenants, and 22,009 report no information for asset sale covenants. Similarly, only 599 observations in
the sample are classified as secured.
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yield and its matching maturity Treasury bond yield.
CSPRDi,t = Y ieldi,t − TY ieldi,t (3.12)
Matched maturity Treasury yields are constructed by interpolation as in Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001). Using Treasury Constant Maturity rates from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank’s Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) for maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and
30 years, I use a linear interpolation scheme to estimate the yield between the Treasury
dates in order to get a matching time to maturity for each bond in the sample.
Asset Liquidity
As a measure of real asset liquidity, I use an industry based index of asset turnover (Schlinge-
mann et al., 2002; Sibilkov, 2009; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014). The index is motivated
by the notion that firm assets tend to be industry specific as shown in both the theoretical
and empirical literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Ramey and Shapiro, 2001; Benmelech
and Bergman, 2009). The index is constructed as follows. From Thomson Reuters SDC
Platinum, I identify 20,362 corporate transactions completed between 1982 and 2011 in
which the form of the deal is classified as either an acquisition of assets or an acquisition of
certain assets. I require that the value of the deal is disclosed and that the target is either
a publicly traded firm or a subsidiary. Each transaction is assigned to the target firm’s in-
dustry as defined by its 2 digit SIC code. The asset liquidity index is then computed as the
ratio of the sum of industry transactions within the year to the total industry book value
of assets (each converted to 1984 dollars). Industries which had no corporate transactions
within a year receive an index value of 0 for that year. Because the liquidity of the industry
should not solely depend on the number of transactions in the one single period, I use a
five-year moving average of the index as the proxy for industry-wide asset liquidity. This
procedure results in 1,663 industry-year values for the index. All firms within the same
industry will each have identical values for the liquidity index each year.
86
Control Variables
Structural models of corporate debt (Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), among others)
show that yield spreads should reflect the bondholder’s expected loss given default. That
is, credit spreads should be function of the probability of default and the expected recovery
rate. While many papers in the literature use structural estimation to generate quantitative
estimates from these models, others (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2007;
Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010; Acharya et al., 2012; Nejadmalayeri et al., 2013) translate
the theoretical determinants of credit spreads into their empirical counterparts and estimate
reduced-form linear regression models. Following this literature, I use a set of variables to
control for a number of firm specific characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and bond
level features which have been shown to be related to credit risk.
At the firm level and bond level, I include controls for:
Size: Ln(Total Assets)
Leverage: Computed as the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book
value of debt and the market value of equity.
Asset Volatility: Computed using the iterated process of Bharath and Shumway
(2008) who use the Merton (1974) model to infer the market value of assets each day.
Asset volatility is then the standard deviation of implied daily asset returns over each
year.
Distance to Default: Computed as d2 from the Merton (1974) model using the
iterative procedure of Bharath and Shumway (2008).
Credit Rating: S&P Long-Term Issuer Rating from COMPUSTAT. As in Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), I translate the S&P letter ratings into numeric ratings from
1-23 such that AAA=1, AA+=2, ... CCC+=17, ... D=23.
Time to Maturity: The number of years to maturity for the firm’s bonds. If a
firm has more than one debt issue outstanding, time to maturity equals the average
time to maturity of all outstanding bonds. Obtained from FISD.
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To control for macroeconomic conditions, I include:
Risk-free interest rate: 10 year constant-maturity Treasury rate obtained for the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).
Slope of Term Structure: Difference between the 10 and 2 year constant matu-
rity Treasury yields. Interest rates obtained from FRED.
Level of the VIX Index: Monthly level of the implied market level volatility ob-
tained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
S&P 500 index monthly return: Obtained from CRSP.
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest as well as the control
variables. The mean credit spread over the sample period is 2.32% and a median of 1.34%.
These values are consistent with credit spreads observed in other studies (e.g. Güntay and
Hackbarth, 2010; Acharya et al., 2012).
[Table 3.1 about here.]
Table 3.2 presents the S&P credit rating distribution of the bonds in the sample. A
majority of the bonds in the sample have a credit rating of either A (A+, A, or A-) or
BBB (BBB+, BBB, BBB-). 33% and 39% of the bonds have either an A rating or BBB
rating, respectively. Very few bonds (2%) have a rating in the AAA range. Consistent with
intuition, as credit ratings decline the credit spread increases. The average time to maturity
for the bonds in the sample is 8.25 years.
[Table 3.2 about here.]
The asset liquidity index has an average value of 0.009 over the sample period. This
means that on average, each industry in the economy (as defined by two digit SIC code) sells
off about 0.90% of its assets each year. The value for the index ranges from 0% to 21.3%
indicating that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the index across both industry
and time.
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[Table 3.3 about here.]
Table 3.3 illustrates the persistence of the asset liquidity index over time. Each year, I
segment the asset liquidity index into quartiles, placing the lowest liquidity industries into
quartile 1 and the highest liquidity industries into quartile 4. Table 3.3 shows that while
there is substantial correlation between contemporaneous asset liquidity and past liquidity,
the correlation diminishes over time. This result is not surprising both from an economic as
well as a methodological perspective. By construction, the asset liquidity index is smoothed
using a five year moving average to limit the effect of extraordinary industry-years in which
a few large asset sale transactions which may portray an industry’s assets to be more liquid
than they actually are. This moving average correction naturally introduces a level of auto-
correlation into the index. From an economic point of view, we would expect liquidity to be
a characteristic which is relatively slow changing. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that
acquisition activity is higher in deregulated and low-tech industries with low research and
development activity and low growth options. However, as shown by Andrade et al. (2001)
restructuring activity often occurs in industry waves. These facts account for the relatively
strong, but diminishing auto-correlation shown in the asset liquidity index.
Table 3.4 presents the correlations of the main variables of interest and the control
variables used in this study. Surprisingly, asset liquidity displays very little unconditional
correlation with credit spreads or any of the control variables
[Table 3.4 about here.]
Univariate Analysis
To gain insight into the relationship between real asset liquidity and credit spreads, I sort
firms each year into quartiles based on their asset liquidity index value. Firms with low
asset liquidity are placed into group 1 and firms with high asset liquidity are placed into
group 4.
[Table 3.5 about here.]
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Table 3.5 presents the credit spread statistics for each of these liquidity groups. Panel A
considers bonds over the entire sample period (1996 - 2013). We can see that firms in the low
liquidity group on average have smaller credit spreads than firms with high liquidity. For the
full sample the difference in means between the high and low liquidity groups is a relatively
small 7 basis points. However, the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Additionally, consistent with the theoretical predictions, a non-linear relationship between
credit spreads and asset liquidity is apparent. This non-linear relationship is especially
apparent in the time period prior to the Financial Crisis.9 While mean credit spreads are
high for low liquidity firms, they decrease in the middle range of asset liquidity, finally
rising again in the upper quartile. As expected, credit spreads are substantially higher in
the post-crisis period. The patterns observed in the full sample as well as the pre-crisis
period break down in the post-crisis period. After 2008, we see that credit spreads for
low liquidity firms are higher than for high liquidity firms (3.34% versus 3.12%). Yet, the
non-linearity of credit spreads across liquidity groups continues to persist.
3.4.3 Results
Following recent literature I estimate a reduced-form model of credit spreads taking into
account the firm and macroeconomic characteristics which have been shown to be the main
determinants of credit risk (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Acharya et al., 2012, among
others).
The baseline specification is estimated as:
CSPRDi,t = α+ β1AssetLiqi,t +ΦXi,t + εi,t (3.13)
where CSPRDi,t is the credit spread on a bond issue of firm i at month t and AssetLiqi,t
is the Industry Asset Liquidity Index as described previously. Xi,t is a vector of control
variables motivated by structural credit risk models. Specifically, Xi,t contains monthly
observations of size, leverage, asset volatility, distance to default, credit rating, the risk free
9Observations prior to 2008 are designated as pre-crisis. Observations from 2008 - 2013 are designated
as post-crisis.
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rate, the slope of the term structure, the level of the VIX, and the S&P 500 return. The
each model in the baseline specification is estimated using pooled OLS regressions with
standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level.
Asset Liquidity and Credit Spreads
Table 3.6 reports estimation results from the baseline credit spread regression model in
equation 3.13. In model (1), the coefficient on asset liquidity is positive and significant. This
indicates that firms that possess assets that are highly marketable tend to have higher credit
spreads. To identify potential non-linearity in the relationship between asset liquidity and
credit spreads, I introduce a quadratic term into the regression model: Asset Liquidity2 =
Asset Liquidity ×Asset Liquidity.
[Table 3.6 about here.]
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on the squared asset liquidity variable is
positive, indicating that the shape of the relationship is convex. For lower values of asset
liquidity, credit spreads are decreasing, and for higher values credit spreads are increasing.
This result is similar to that of Sibilkov (2009) who finds non-linearity in the relationship
between firm leverage and asset liquidity. When asset liquidity is low, it is too costly for
managers to engage in asset sales that could be detrimental to bondholders. This notion is
reflected both in the cost of debt as well as the degree of firm leverage.
Models (3) - (6) segment the sample period into the pre-Financial Crisis years (before
2008) and the post-Financial crisis period (2008 and beyond). Models (3) and (4) indicate
that the positive relationship between credit spreads and asset liquidity holds regardless
of the time period. The non-linearity, however, is present primarily in the post-Financial
Crisis period.
To get an indication of the form of the non-linearity in the relationship between bond
spreads and asset liquidity, I design a piecewise linear regression with breakpoints corre-
sponding to low, medium, and high asset liquidity. This methodology is used in Yu (2005)
to investigate non-linearities in corporate bond term structures and by Das and Hanouna
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(2009) to control for non-linear effects of the interest coverage ratio on CDS spreads. To
implement this model, I compute percentile breakpoints for the asset liquidity index each
year and assign firms to their corresponding liquidity group. These breakpoints serve as
knots which allow us to examine the slope of the regression function over a particular range
of values.
Table 3.7 presents the function imposed to capture the non-linearity in the credit spread-
asset liquidity relationship.
[Table 3.7 about here.]
Specifically, for firms that have low asset liquidity (those with index values between 0
and the 15th percentile of that year) take on a values of the index value, 0, 0, and 0 for the
variables Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, respectively. Similarly, firms in the highest liquidity group
(with index values ranging from the 85th and 100th percentile of that year) take on values
equal to the 15th percentile, 15th percentile, 50th percentile, and the index value minus the
85th percentile for Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, respectively. I augment the regression model in 3.13
to include these terms. I estimate using pooled OLS the following.
CSPRDi,t = α+ β1AssetLiqi,t + β2Z1 + β3Z2 + β4Z3 + β1Z4 +ΦXi,t + εi,t (3.14)
Table 3.8 presents regression estimates of equation 3.14.
[Table 3.8 about here.]
Model (1) presents estimates on the model over the full sample period. The coefficient
on Z1 is negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that for firms with low
asset liquidity (in the range of 0 to the 15th percentile) will experience decreasing credit
spreads as asset liquidity increases. This, again, is consistent with convex relationships
between credit spreads and liquidity depicted in figures 3.2 to 3.5. This result holds in the
pre-Financial Crisis period, but the relationship reverses post-2007. The coefficient on Z1
becomes positive, suggesting a concave relationship between spreads and liquidity among
low liquidity firms. That is as liquidity increases within this range, credit spreads increase
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as well. This finding could a result of increased asset sales that were undertaken by firms in
distress during the financial crisis period. Firms which possess assets with low liquidity will
usually choose not to use asset sales during normal times as they fetch prices lower than
their true values. However during the financial crisis period all firms increased their level
of assets sales (Campello et al., 2010). If these asset sales conducted by low asset liquidity
firms during the crisis were conducted for reasons of distress, we would observe this concave
relationship.
The Effects of Leverage
Bondholders of high leverage firms are more exposed to agency problems than creditors of
less levered firms. The potential for asset sales magnifies this agency problem as it becomes
more feasible for managers to engage in asset substitution and expropriate wealth from
bondholders. To test this hypothesis, I segment the firms into categories based on leverage
( book value of debt
book value of debt+market value of equity ). Each year I rank firms into three leverage groups
with the lowest 33% going to low leverage and the to 33% going to high leverage.
[Table 3.9 about here.]
Consistent with hypothesis 2, table 3.9 shows that asset liquidity is positively related to
credit spreads only among firms with high leverage. In models (1) and (2), we see got low
leverage firms, asset liquidity has no association with credit spreads. As the the bondholders
of these firms are not as exposed to the risks of wealth transfers due to asset sales, creditors
will not demand as much of a premium for their investment. Conversely, among high
leverage firms, the positive relationship between real asset liquidity and credit risk continues
to persist.
The Effects of Growth Opportunities
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the impact of asset liquidity on credit spreads should be stronger
among firms with larger growth opportunities. The rationale is that selling assets to finance
investment may not be worthwhile when the gains to investment are minimal. Especially
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for firms with low levels of asset liquidity, the costs associated with asset sales outweigh the
benefits from investment. When profitable growth opportunities are prevalent, asset sales
become more feasible particularly for those firms that can liquidate assets are relatively low
costs. The increased possibility of asset sales increases the risk of bondholder payoffs and,
as a result, the value of debt will fall (credit spreads will rise).
[Table 3.10 about here.]
To test this hypothesis, I subset the sample according to the size of each firm’s growth
opportunities. I measure a firm’s growth opportunities with an industry level proxy. Specif-
ically, a firm’s growth options is defined as the median ratio of intangible assets to total
assets in the firm’s industry each year. Each year, firms are ranked on this measure of
growth opportunities and placed into three groups. The highest 33% of firms are classified
as having high growth opportunities and the lowest 33% are classified as having low growth
opportunities.
3.10 presents regression results on this segmented sample. Model (1) shows that for
firms with low growth opportunities there is a negative relationship between asset liquidity
in credit spreads. This is consistent with the notion that firms with low growth opportu-
nities will choose not to sell assets in order to finance investment. In this case, the assets
within the firm will remain in place and thus increased liquidity increases the recovery
value to bondholders rather than increase the probability of wealth transfers due to asset
sales. Consistent with hypothesis 3, model (3) indicates that for firms with high growth
opportunities, increased asset liquidity results in higher credit spreads.
The curvilinear relationship displayed previously exhibits puzzling properties when fo-
cusing on growth options. While there exists a U-shaped pattern in the credit spread-asset
liquidity relationship over the full sample, the negative coefficient on the quadratic terms in
models (2) and (4) suggests that an inverted U-shape exists when the sample is segmented
by growth options.
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The Role of Debt Covenants
Debt covenants are put into bond contracts in order to protect bondholders from firm
behaviors that could be harmful to debt claims. One such protective covenant is a restriction
on asset sales. While some covenants outright prohibit asset sales, others simply place
restrictions on the usage of the asset sale proceeds, often requiring the proceeds be used
to repay debt. These restrictions explicitly makes bondholders’ debt claims safer and in
turn should result in lower credit spreads (Morellec, 2001; Myers and Rajan, 1998). When
asset sales are prohibited, the real assets of the firm serve as collateral no matter how
liquid the assets are. In fact, increased asset liquidity should increase the recovery rate to
creditors in the event of default, again making debt safer. Therefore hypothesis 4 predicts
that among secured bonds or bonds with asset sale restrictions, the will be a negative
association between credit spreads and asset liquidity.
I test this hypothesis in two ways. First, I create an indicator variable, Covenant that
takes on a value of 1 if the firm’s debt has covenants restricting asset sales and 0 otherwise.
I do the same regarding secured debt. I create an indicator variable Secured that has a
value equal to 1 is the firm’s debt is listed as secured, and 0 otherwise. Table 3.11shows
the impact of protective covenants on the relationship between asset liquidity and credit
spreads.
[Table 3.11 about here.]
Panel A uses a continuous measure of the asset liquidity index in the regression model.
Model (1) of table 3.11 shows that asset sale covenants do indeed make corporate debt
safer by restricting the behavior of the firm. While credit spreads are increasing with asset
liquidity, the inclusion of an asset sale clause is associated with smaller credit spreads. In
model (2) I introduce an interaction variable, Asset Liquidity × Covenant, in order to
demonstrate the effect. The results from model (2) suggest that the presence of asset sale
restrictions mitigate the risk that bondholders face when firms possess liquid real assets.
The negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that when there are asset sale
covenants in place, increasing asset liquidity works to reduce credit spreads. Also interesting,
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the coefficient on Covenant loses significance after the inclusion of the interaction term.
This suggests that the existence of asset sale covenants do not, by themselves, reduce
credit spreads. It is only when the firm has sufficiently salable assets that the covenant
demonstrates its value.
Models (3) and (4) present similar analysis with secured debt. Intuitively, secured debt
should have narrower credit spreads than unsecured debt. Because secured debt claims are
tied directly to the firm’s assets, they have priority in the event of default and thus have
great recovery values. Consistent with this logic, the coefficient on Secured is negative and
statically significant. Securing bonds results in smaller credit spreads. Unlike the case for
asset sale covenants, however, the interaction term, Asset Liquidity × Secured, shows no
significant association with credit spreads.
Panel B focuses just on firms classified as highly liquid (i.e. firms in the 25% of the
asset liquidity index in a given year). After controlling for the existence of asset sale
covenants or secured debt, the positive relationship seen previously between asset liquidity
and credit spreads diminishes. For secured debt the coefficient on the interaction term
Asset Liquidity×Secured is negative and significant. This suggests that when debt claims
are secured, possessing liquid real assets reduces the risk that these bondholders are exposed
to. In the event of default, these secured creditors will recover a larger fraction of the claim
if the firm’s assets are highly liquid.
It is necessary to view these results with a bit a skepticism because very few bond issues
contained in FISD report either bonds as secured or as containing asset sale covenants.
Only 1489 observations (4.4% of the sample) explicitly contain restrictions on asset sales,
10,543 (31% of the sample) explicitly report no covenants, and 22,009 (64.6% of the sample)
report no information for asset sale covenants. Similarly, only 599 observations (1.8% of
the sample) in the sample are classified as secured. Therefore the results in this section
may be influenced by the fact that there are very few firms in the sample which issue bonds
that have features which explicitly protect bondholders from the risks associated with asset
liquidity.
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The Intermediating Effects of Cash
Hypothesis 5 suggests that cash holdings play an intermediating role in the connection
between corporate credit spreads and real asset liquidity. To examine this effect I introduce
an interaction term, AssetLiqi,t × Cashi,t into the model, where Cash is the ratio of cash
and short-term investments to total assets. Specifically, I estimate equation 3.15.
CSPRDi,t = α+ β1AssetLiqi,t + β2Cashi,t + β3AssetLiqi,t ×Cashi,t +ΦXi,t + εi,t (3.15)
Coefficient estimates from equation 3.15 are presented in table 3.12. Models (1) and (2)
are estimated using OLS. In both models indicate that after introducing the effects of cash,
a positive relationship remains between asset liquidity and credit spreads. The positive
coefficient on the interaction term AssetLiqi,t ×Cashi,t suggests that higher cash balances
amplify the credit risk effects of asset liquidity. That is at higher levels of cash holdings,
the positive effects of asset liquidity on credit spreads become stronger. This result is at
odds with intuition.
Additionally, the positive coefficient on cash found in models (1) and (2) is counterintu-
itive. Common economic intuition suggests that larger cash reserves should make a firm’s
corporate debt safer and decrease its probability of default and thus lower its spreads. As
shown in equation 3.9, the optimal level of cash from the bondholder’s perspective reflects
the desire to completely hedge the firm’s business risk. A positive relationship between
cash and credit spreads suggests, however, that holding more cash increases the risks that
bondholders are exposed to. Acharya et al. (2012) argue that the an endogenous connection
cash holdings to credit spreads drives the puzzling positive correlation observed in OLS re-
gressions. Riskier firms naturally hold larger cash balances simply because they are exposed
to more risks.
The authors utilize an instrumental variables approach to remove the confounding effects
of endogeniety in the relationship between cash and credit spreads isolate the effects of cash
which are unrelated to credit. The instruments are selected so as to affect the level of cash
holdings, and at the same time have no impact on payoffs to debtholders. To ensure that I
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examine the ’pure’ effect of cash holdings on the asset liquidity-credit spreads relationship
in my analysis, I employ the instrumental variables approach of Acharya et al. (2012).
Acharya et al. (2012) determine that a firm’s growth options and managerial agency
costs are appropriate instruments for cash. I proxy for growth options using the median
ratio of intangible assets to total assets in the firm’s industry each year (GrowthOpsi,t).
Managerial agency is measured as the ratio of the CEO’s cash compensation to the market
value of his shares and options (Agencyi,t).
10
[Table 3.12 about here.]
Models (3) - (5) of table 3.12 are estimated using this instrumental variable regression
approach. Model (5) includes the interaction term AssetLiqi,t × Cashi,t, which itself is an
endogenous variable. Balli and Srensen (2013) show that in the case where a variable, X2 is
endogenous, X1 is exogenous, and Z is a valid instrument for the endogenous variable X2,
then the interaction X1Z will be a valid instrument for the interaction X1X2. Therefore,
I include interactions with the instruments (AssetLiqi,t ×GrowthOpsi,t and AssetLiqi,t ×
Agencyi,t) to serve as an instruments for AssetLiqi,t × Cashi,t.
Model (3) confirms the result of Acharya et al. (2012). After controlling for the endoge-
nous nature of cash and credit risk, credit spreads are decreasing with cash. Including asset
liquidity into model (4) we see that the positive cash and credit spreads remain positively
related. Model (5) introduces the interaction variable AssetLiqi,t×Cashi,t. While the sign
on the interaction coefficient is negative, it lacks any meaningful statistical significance.
This may be, however due to the non-linearity in the relationship between bond spreads
and asset liquidity. As illustrated previously, the relationship between credit spreads and
asset liquidity is convex. That is, spreads are decreasing with asset liquidity in the low
liquidity ranges and increasing in high liquidity ranges. Therefore, we would not expect
to see any ameliorating effects of cash holdings on the relationship among firms with low
asset liquidity. It is the firms with high asset liquidity which pose the greatest threat to
the claims of bondholders. High cash balances will work to partially alleviate this threat.
10Managerial agency is computed using ExecuComp and is defined as (salary + bonus + other annual
compensation + long-term incentive plan + all other compensation) / (value of the CEO’s equity stake +
value of all unexercised options owned.
98
To test if there are differential impacts at the two extreme ends of the asset liquidity index,
I classify firms as high and low liquidity according to the non-linear regression scheme in
table 3.7. Specifically, I define High Asset Liquidity as an indicator variable which takes
on a value of 1 if the firm is ranked in the top 15th percentile and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I
define Low Asset Liquidity as an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is
ranked in the bottom 15th percentile and 0 otherwise.
[Table 3.13 about here.]
Indeed as shown in table 3.13, the intermediating effect of cash holdings for high asset
liquidity firms is quite apparent. Model (1) shows that while firms with high asset liquidity
tend to have larger credit spreads, increasing cash balances works to diminish the magnitude
of the impact. Conversely for firms with low real asset liquidity, the interaction term in
Model (2) is statistically insignificant. This consistent with the notion that the likelihood
that the firm with low liquidity would choose to sell its assets. Firms with low asset liquidity
would receive low prices in asset sales and thus they are unlikely to exhibit such behavior.
Therefore, the mitigating impact of cash holdings on firms with low real asset liquidity is
negligible.
3.5 Conclusion
Motivated by recent ideas that asset sales can indeed as means for raising capital, we extend
the Acharya et al. (2012) model and show that the market liquidity for a firms real assets
affects credit spreads non-linearly in a U-shaped manner. The intuition is as follows: a firm
will partially liquidate assets so long as the liquidation can prevent default and safeguard
future lucrative payoffs. Such a firm essentially may trade-off having larger cash holdings
upfront in favor of asset liquidation when the market liquidity for asset sales is high enough.
However, as market liquidity dissipates, so does the cost of making such a trade-off. The
firm would at some point find it more beneficial to hold large cash at hand and consider asset
liquidation infeasible. Comparative statics analysis demonstrates that as the firm’s leverage
and growth options increase, so does the aforementioned non-linearity of the relationship
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between real asset liquidity and credit spreads. We empirically test our predication and find
that indeed the link between credit spreads and real asset liquidity is U-shaped. Moreover,
highly levered firms and firms with growth option face much more pronounced non-linearity.
Our empirical analysis confirm some of these findings. Using an industry-based measure
of real asset liquidity, we show that a convex relationship exists between credit spreads
and asset liquidity such that at low (high) levels of liquidity credit spreads are decreasing
(increasing) with real asset liquidity. This is consistent with the notion that at low levels
of liquidity financing with asset sales is not a reasonable choice. Therefore increasing asset
liquidity in a sufficiently low range of liquidity raises creditors’ expected recovery value
without increasing the threat of wealth expropriation. At higher ranges of liquidity, the
threat of wealth expropriation through asset sales is possible and therefore credit spreads
are increasing with real asset liquidity. Additionally, this effect is isolated among high
leverage firms in which wealth expropriation effects to creditors is the greatest. Finally
within firms with high asset liquidity, the presence of large cash balances works to offset
increases in credit spreads that are due to the increased ability to sell assets.
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Figure 3.1: Asset Selling Price Function
This figure shows illustrates the selling price of assets which is determined by both the






























Figure 3.2: Credit Spread vs. Asset Market Liquidity: Leverage
This figure illustrates how credit spreads changes with asset market liquidity α for various leverage
ratios. The face value of debt, B, denotes the leverage ratio since the expansion project size is kept
constant. The parameter settings are as follows: x0 = 10, x1 ∼ U [20, 10], and, x2 = 20. Additionally,





























Figure 3.3: Credit Spread vs. Asset Market Liquidity: Project Profitability
This figure illustrates how credit spreads changes with asset market liquidity α for various levels of
profitability, β0. The parameter settings are as follows: face value of debt B = 150, x0 = 10, x1 ∼
U [20, 10], and, x2 = 20. Additionally, I0 = 100, and, I1 = 150. Moreover, f(I0) = β0 I0, where β0






























Figure 3.4: Credit Spread vs. Asset Market Liquidity: Average Cash Flow
This figure shows how credit spreads changes with asset market liquidity α for various levels of
expected cash flows, x, at time 1. The parameter settings are as follows: face value of debt B = 150
x0 = 10 and x2 = 20. Additionally, I0 = 100, and, I1 = 150. Moreover, f(I0) = β0 I0, where






























Figure 3.5: Credit Spread vs. Asset Market Liquidity: Cash Flow Range
This figure shows how credit spreads changes with asset market liquidity α for various ranges of cash
flows at time 1, x − x. The parameter settings are as follows: face value of debt B = 150 x0 = 10
and x2 = 20. Additionally, I0 = 100, and, I1 = 150. Moreover, f(I0) = β0 I0, where β0 = 1.3 and































Figure 3.6: Relationships Between Asset Liquidity, Cash, and Credit Spreads

















Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the each of the variables used in this study. The
variables are defined as follows. Credit Spread: yield on a bond over an equivalent maturity Treasury
bond, Asset Liquidity: industry-based measure of asset liquidity measured as total assets sold in
an industry / total industry assets, Leverage: book value of debt divided by the sum of the book
value of debt and the market value of equity, Size: ln(Assets), Distance to Default: d2 from the
Merton (1974) model using the iterative procedure of Bharath and Shumway (2008), Asset Volatility:
standard deviation of implied daily asset returns, Maturity: average number of years to maturity
for the firm’s bonds, Risk-free: 10 year constant-maturity Treasury rate, Slope: Difference between
the 10 and 2 year constant maturity Treasury yields, VIX: Monthly level of VIX index, S&P500:
Monthly return on S&P500, Rating: Numerical credit rating.
Mean Median St. Dev Min Max N
Credit Spread 2.065 1.334 2.588 0.001 39.997 34041
Asset Liquidity 0.009 0.006 0.009 -0.000 0.213 34041
Leverage 0.269 0.224 0.190 0.000 1.000 26591
Size 9.083 9.077 1.206 6.021 13.649 34041
Distance to Default 7.324 6.635 4.842 -6.652 40.427 25557
Asset Volatility 0.287 0.260 0.157 0.010 9.616 25557
Maturity 8.278 6.577 6.060 1.000 29.995 34041
Risk-free 4.674 4.610 1.201 1.510 6.960 34041
Slope 1.079 0.700 0.969 -0.470 2.840 34041
VIX 0.217 0.211 0.075 0.104 0.599 33833
S&P500 0.007 0.010 0.045 -0.169 0.108 34041
Rating 7.864 8.000 2.995 1.000 20.000 33000
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Table 3.2: Credit Spread by Issuer Credit Rating
This table presents credit spreads by issuer credit rating. AA contains firms with ratings of AA+,
AA, and AA-, BBB contains firms with ratings of BBB+, BBB, and BBB-, etc.
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
AAA 0.592 0.490 0.363 0.733 0.381 780
AA 0.744 0.617 0.414 0.918 0.489 2710
A 1.149 0.955 0.633 1.455 0.794 11435
BBB 1.979 1.590 1.010 2.437 1.553 13204
BB 4.149 3.352 2.260 4.960 3.108 3233
B 6.374 4.818 3.086 7.712 5.141 1498
CCC or below 4.746 2.154 1.108 4.920 6.573 1181
Total 2.065 1.334 0.772 2.357 2.588 34041
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Table 3.3: Persistence of Asset Liquidity
This table shows the correlation of the asset liquidity index over time. Each year, the asset liquidity
index is segmented into quartiles, placing the lowest liquidity industries into quartile 1 and the
highest liquidity industries into quartile 4. Liqrank takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in the 1st
quartile, 2 if in the 2nd quartile, and so on.
Liqrankt Liqrankt−1 Liqrankt−2 Liqrankt−3 Liqrankt−4 Liqrankt−5
Liqrankt 1
Liqrankt−1 0.825 1
Liqrankt−2 0.694 0.820 1
Liqrankt−3 0.588 0.690 0.819 1
Liqrankt−4 0.560 0.580 0.685 0.815 1
Liqrankt−5 0.546 0.550 0.575 0.680 0.816 1
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix
This table presents the correlations of each of the variables used in this study. The variables are defined as follows. Credit Spread: yield on a bond
over an equivalent maturity Treasury bond, Asset Liquidity: industry-based measure of asset liquidity measured as total assets sold in an industry
/ total industry assets, Leverage: book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity, Size: ln(Assets),
Distance to Default: d2 from the Merton (1974) model using the iterative procedure of Bharath and Shumway (2008), Asset Volatility: standard
deviation of implied daily asset returns, Maturity: average number of years to maturity for the firm’s bonds, Risk-free: 10 year constant-maturity
Treasury rate, Slope: Difference between the 10 and 2 year constant maturity Treasury yields, VIX: Monthly level of VIX index, S&P500: Monthly
return on S&P500, Rating: Numerical credit rating.
CSPRD AssetLiq Lev Size Dist to Def AssetVol Maturity Risk-free Slope VIX S&P Rating
Credit Spread 1.00
Asset Liquidity -0.01 1.00
Leverage 0.52 -0.09 1.00
Size -0.13 -0.17 -0.06 1.00
Distance to Default -0.46 0.04 -0.64 0.14 1.00
Asset Volatility 0.26 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.41 1.00
Maturity -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.00 1.00
Risk-free -0.25 0.14 -0.02 -0.27 -0.02 0.02 0.01 1.00
Slope 0.24 -0.12 0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.08 -0.03 -0.62 1.00
VIX 0.29 0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.35 0.29 0.05 -0.14 0.23 1.00
S&P500 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.36 1.00
Rating 0.58 -0.03 0.62 -0.35 -0.51 0.15 -0.09 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
Table 3.5: Credit Spreads by Asset Liquidity
This table presents credit spreads for each asset liquidity ranking. Each year firms are ranked
according to the asset liquidity index. Firms in the bottom 25% are assigned to group 1. Firms
between 25% and 50% are assigned to group 2. Firms between 50% and 75% are assigned to group 3.
Firms in the top 25% are assigned to group 4. 4− 1 reports the difference in cash holdings between
the high and low liquidity groups. Panel A reports results over the full sample period. Panel B
reports results in the pre-Financial Crisis period, defined as all observations before 2008. Panel C
reports results in the post-Financial Crisis period, defined as 2008 and onward
Panel A: Full Sample
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 2.097 1.296 0.772 2.233 2.797 11439
2 2.101 1.456 0.840 2.588 2.179 6406
3 1.904 1.255 0.708 2.180 2.274 8642
4 2.170 1.396 0.792 2.506 2.892 7554
Total 2.065 1.334 0.772 2.357 2.588 34041
High - Low 0.072 t-stat 1.90*
Panel B: Pre Crisis
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 1.894 1.185 0.731 1.953 2.634 9827
2 1.735 1.157 0.737 1.912 2.062 4537
3 1.695 1.116 0.664 1.896 2.086 7274
4 1.944 1.220 0.730 2.034 2.874 6163
Total 1.827 1.169 0.715 1.944 2.475 27801
High - Low 0.051 t-stat 1.26
Panel B: Post Crisis
Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev N
1 3.340 2.326 1.465 3.918 3.379 1612
2 2.989 2.479 1.695 3.494 2.202 1869
3 3.016 2.230 1.390 3.634 2.841 1368
4 3.172 2.681 1.576 3.908 2.753 1391
Total 3.126 2.431 1.543 3.734 2.807 6240
High - Low -0.168 t-stat -1.64
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Table 3.6: Real Asset Liquidity and Credit Spreads
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiqi,t +
β2AssetLiq
2
i,t + ΦXi,t + εi,t, where Xt is a vector of control variables. Models (1) and (2) are
estimated using the full sample period. Models (3) and (5) are estimated over the pre-Financial
Crisis period, defined as prior to 2008. Models (4) and (6) are estimated over the post-Financial
Crisis periods, defined as 2008 and onward. t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Constant -2.765*** -2.823*** -2.073*** -3.603*** -2.135*** -3.484***
(-8.87) (-9.06) (-6.09) (-5.27) (-6.26) (-5.06)
Asset Liquidity 8.877*** 17.19*** 4.137*** 28.94*** 11.76*** 3.094
(6.67) (4.19) (3.53) (5.49) (2.58) (0.42)
Asset Liquidity 2 155.4** 134.9 723.2***
(1.99) (1.57) (2.73)
Leverage 3.917*** 3.934*** 3.641*** 6.541*** 3.660*** 6.493***
(11.98) (12.09) (9.80) (15.07) (9.89) (15.11)
Size -0.0191 -0.0166 -0.0163 -0.166*** -0.0141 -0.170***
(-1.59) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-4.12) (-1.18) (-4.20)
Distance to Default 0.0456*** 0.0455*** 0.0366*** 0.0922*** 0.0365*** 0.0931***
(3.82) (3.82) (2.71) (7.42) (2.72) (7.48)
Asset Volatility 2.762*** 2.748*** 2.755*** 2.678*** 2.742*** 2.694***
(4.28) (4.27) (3.55) (6.68) (3.54) (6.68)
Maturity 0.00838*** 0.00826*** 0.00430*** 0.0135*** 0.00419*** 0.0152***
(6.10) (5.99) (3.32) (2.89) (3.21) (3.28)
Risk-free -0.317*** -0.319*** -0.269*** 0.0900*** -0.269*** 0.0949***
(-27.48) (-27.85) (-19.02) (2.90) (-19.00) (3.13)
Slope 0.0780*** 0.0784*** 0.102*** -0.564*** 0.102*** -0.569***
(5.58) (5.61) (6.60) (-11.81) (6.62) (-11.98)
VIX 6.976*** 6.967*** 4.686*** 10.47*** 4.671*** 10.53***
(20.27) (20.31) (12.41) (19.26) (12.45) (19.36)
S&P500 1.367*** 1.384*** 0.176 7.114*** 0.185 7.190***
(3.99) (4.04) (0.50) (9.51) (0.52) (9.59)
Rating 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.277*** 0.372*** 0.277*** 0.371***
(28.46) (28.55) (21.59) (18.14) (21.66) (17.98)
Observations 24664 24664 19720 4944 19720 4944
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.504 0.438 0.661 0.439 0.662
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Table 3.7: Non-Linear Regression Scheme
This table illustrates the breakpoints a the piecewise linear regression. Firms that have low asset
liquidity (those with index values between 0 and the 15th percentile of that year) take on a values of
the index value, 0, 0, and 0 for the variables Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, respectively. Firms in the highest
liquidity group (with index values ranging from the 85th and 100th percentile of that year) take on
values equal to the 15th percentile, 15th percentile, 50th percentile, and the index value minus the
85th percentile for Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4, respectively.
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
Liq ∈ [0, P15) Liq 0 0 0
Liq ∈ [P15, P50) P15 Liq − P15 0 0
Liq ∈ [P50, P85) P15 P15 Liq − P50 0
Liq ∈ [P85, P100] P15 P15 P50 Liq − P85
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Table 3.8: Non-Linearity of Asset Liquidity
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model:
CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiqi,t + β2Z1 + β3Z2 + β4Z3 + β1Z4 + ΦXi,t + εi,t is a vector of control
variables. Zis are the piece-wise linear censored asset liquidity variables which are constructed as
described in Table 3.7. Models (1) is estimated using the full sample period. Model (2) is estimated
over the pre-Financial Crisis period, defined as prior to 2008. Model is estimated over the post-
Financial Crisis periods, defined as 2008 and onward. t-statistics computed using robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Constant -2.732*** -1.924*** -3.311***
(-8.83) (-5.84) (-5.00)
Z1 -28.35*** -67.64*** 132.1**
(-2.98) (-7.11) (2.13)
Z2 55.94*** 77.99*** -87.65***
(6.62) (8.78) (-2.61)
Z3 5.767 5.165 13.86
(1.03) (0.80) (1.34)
Z4 2.738 -4.648** 58.01***
(1.34) (-2.43) (5.16)
Leverage 3.925*** 3.694*** 6.486***
(12.17) (10.23) (14.98)
Size -0.0247** -0.0239** -0.175***
(-2.03) (-2.00) (-4.45)
Distance to Default 0.0470*** 0.0380*** 0.0933***
(3.96) (2.88) (7.55)
Asset Volatility 2.761*** 2.730*** 2.631***
(4.29) (3.56) (6.54)
Maturity 0.00825*** 0.00410*** 0.0162***
(5.91) (3.09) (3.49)
Risk-free -0.317*** -0.275*** -0.00442
(-27.21) (-18.94) (-0.06)
Slope 0.0748*** 0.0916*** -0.478***
(5.20) (5.74) (-5.86)
VIX 7.022*** 4.700*** 10.31***
(20.53) (12.81) (18.85)
S&P500 1.396*** 0.287 7.141***
(4.07) (0.81) (9.50)
Rating 0.318*** 0.277*** 0.369***
(28.97) (22.04) (18.30)
Observations 24615 19683 4932
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.440 0.664
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Table 3.9: Effects of Leverage
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiqi,t +
β2AssetLiq
2
i,t + ΦXi,t + εi,t, where Xt is a vector of control variables. Firms are segmented by
leverage. Each year firms are ranked into three leverage groups with the lowest 33% going to low
leverage and the to 33% going to high leverage. t-statistics computed using robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage High Leverage
Constant -0.493*** -0.501*** -5.087*** -5.246***
(-2.80) (-2.85) (-10.22) (-10.39)
Asset Liquidity 0.589 1.796 25.00*** 42.56***
(0.75) (1.00) (7.02) (6.60)
Asset Liquidity 2 -24.29 -370.0***
(-0.79) (-3.82)
Observations 8400 8400 8016 8016
Adjusted R2 0.508 0.508 0.532 0.533
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Table 3.10: Effects of Growth Opportunities
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiqi,t +
β2AssetLiq
2
i,t+ΦXi,t+εi,t, where Xt is a vector of control variables. Firms are segmented by growth
opportunities. Each year, firms are ranked on this measure of growth opportunities and placed into
three groups. Growth options are defined as the median ratio of intangible assets to total assets in
the firm’s industry each year The highest 33% of firms are classified as having high growth oppor-
tunities and the lowest 33% are classified as having low growth opportunities. t-statistics computed
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Growth Low Growth High Growth High Growth
Constant 0.102 0.0329 -3.684*** -3.806***
(0.26) (0.09) (-7.91) (-8.07)
Asset Liquidity -5.206*** 4.264 11.31*** 21.73***
(-3.00) (1.21) (7.01) (4.92)
Asset Liquidity 2 -190.0*** -180.2***
(-4.27) (-3.09)
Observations 6006 6006 9189 9189
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.525 0.506 0.506
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Table 3.11: The Impact of Restrictive Covenants
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiquidityi,t +
β2Covenant+β3Secured+β4AssetLiquidity×Covenant+β5AssetLiquidity×Secured+ΦXi,t+εi,t,
where Xt is a vector of control variables. Covenant is an indicator variable that takes on a value of
1 if the firm has asset sales covenants and 0 otherwise. Secured is an indicator variable that takes
on a value of 1 if the firm’s debt is secured and 0 otherwise. Panel B replaces the continous variable
AssetLiquidity with an indicator variable HighLiquidity which takes on a value of 1 if the firm is
in the upper 25% of the asset liquidity index and 0 otherwise. t-statistics computed using robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Panel A:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.921*** -1.061*** -2.686*** -2.686***
(-3.58) (-3.88) (-8.58) (-8.58)
Asset Liquidity 11.43*** 26.51*** 8.622*** 8.556***





Asset Liquidity x Covenant -15.67*
(-1.81)
Asset Liquidity x Secured 6.679
(0.58)
Observations 12032 12032 24664 24664
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.492 0.504 0.504
Panel B:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.695*** -0.640** -2.530*** -2.526***
(-2.74) (-2.49) (-8.22) (-8.21)
High Liquidity 0.0578 -0.137 0.0360 0.0427





High Liquidity x Covenant 0.227**
(2.03)
High Liquidity x Secured -0.834***
(-5.53)
Observations 12032 12032 24664 24664
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.490 0.503 0.503
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Table 3.12: The Intermediating Effects of Cash
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1AssetLiquidityi,t +
β2Cashi,t+β3AssetLiquidity×Cash+ΦXi,t+εi,t, where Xt is a vector of control variables. Models
1 and 2 are estimated using pooled OLS regressions. Models 3-5 are estimated using an Instrumental
Variables regression. t-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Constant -2.736*** -2.704*** -3.865*** -3.905*** -3.942***
(-8.95) (-8.86) (-13.22) (-13.56) (-13.63)
Asset Liquidity 9.213*** 6.640*** 8.000*** 11.00***
(6.96) (4.37) (6.06) (3.52)
Cash 1.346*** 0.952*** -6.161*** -4.697*** -4.125***
(9.55) (5.85) (-6.02) (-4.79) (-3.28)
Asset Liquidity x Cash 45.91*** -54.26
(3.87) (-1.05)
Observations 24664 24664 21710 21710 21710
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.508 0.442 0.478 0.480
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Table 3.13: Asset Liquidity, Cash, and Credit Spreads
This table presents coefficient estimates from the model: CSPRDi,t = α + β1HighLiquidityi,t +
β2LowLiquidityi,t +β3Cashi,t +β4HighLiquidity×Cash+β5LowLiquidity×Cash+ΦXi,t + εi,t,
where Xt is a vector of control variables. Models (1) and (2) are estimated using instrumental




High Asset Liquidity 1.384***
(5.17)




High Asset Liquidity x Cash -19.47***
(-5.22)
Low Asset Liquidity x Cash 4.792
(0.82)
Observations 21710 21710
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.472
119
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acharya, Viral, Sergei A. Davydenko, and Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2012, Cash holdings and
credit risk, Review of Financial Studies 25, 3572–3609.
Acharya, Viral V., Heitor Almeida, and Murillo Campello, 2007, Is cash negative debt? A
hedging perspective on corporate financial policies, Journal of Financial Intermediation
16, 515–554.
Acharya, Viral V., Rangarajan K. Sundaram, and Kose John, 2011, Cross-country variations
in capital structures: The role of bankruptcy codes, Journal of Financial Intermediation
20, 25–54.
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton, 1992, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Finan-
cial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies 59, 473–94.
Akerlof, George G., 1970, The market for ”lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
Almeida, Heitor, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2004, The cash flow sensitiv-
ity of cash, The Journal of Finance 59, 1777–1804.
Andrade, Gregor, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford, 2001, New Evidence and Perspectives
on Mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103–120.
Arnold, Marc, Dirk Hackbarth, and Tatjana-Xenia Puhan, 2014, Financing Asset Sales and
Business Cycles, Working paper, Swiss Finance Institute.
Asquith, Paul, Thom Covert, and Parag Pathak, 2013, The Effects of Mandatory Trans-
parency in Financial Market Design: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market, NBER
Working Papers 19417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Asquith, Paul, Robert Gertner, and David Scharfstein, 1994, Anatomy of financial distress:
An examination of junk-bond issuers, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 625–58.
Balli, Hatice, and Bent Srensen, 2013, Interaction effects in econometrics, Empirical Eco-
nomics 45, 583–603.
Bates, Thomas W., 2005, Asset sales, investment opportunities, and the use of proceeds,
The Journal of Finance 60, 105–135.
Bates, Thomas W., Kathleen M. Kahle, and Rene M. Stulz, 2009, Why do u.s. firms hold
so much more cash than they used to?, The Journal of Finance 64, 1985–2021.
Baumol, William J., 1952, The transactions demand for cash: An inventory theoretic ap-
proach, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 66, 545–556.
Benmelech, Efraim, 2008, Asset salability and debt maturity: Evidence from nineteenth-
century american railroads, Review of Financial Studies 22, 1545–1584.
120
Benmelech, Efraim, and Nittai K. Bergman, 2009, Collateral pricing, Journal of Financial
Economics 91, 339–360.
Benmelech, Efraim, Mark J. Garmaise, and Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2005, Do Liquidation Val-
ues Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning
Regulation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1121–1154.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, Kathleen M. Kahle, William F. Maxwell, and Danielle Xu, 2009,
Measuring Abnormal Bond Performance, Review of Financial Studies 22, 4219–4258.
Bharath, Sreedhar T., and Tyler Shumway, 2008, Forecasting default with the merton
distance to default model, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1339–1369.
Black, Fischer, and John C Cox, 1976, Valuing corporate securities: Some effects of bond
indenture provisions, Journal of Finance 31, 351–67.
Black, Fischer, and Myron S Scholes, 1973, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities,
Journal of Political Economy 81, 637–54.
Bloom, Nicholas, 2009, The impact of uncertainty shocks, Econometrica 77, 623–685.
Bolton, Patrick, Hui Chen, and Neng Wang, 2011, A Unified Theory of Tobin’s q, Corporate
Investment, Financing, and Risk Management, Journal of Finance 66, 1545–1578.
Borisova, Ginka, and James R. Brown, 2013, R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New
evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment, Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance 37, 159 – 173.
Borisova, Ginka, Kose John, and Valentina Salotti, 2013, The value of financing through
cross-border asset sales: Shareholder returns and liquidity, Journal of Corporate Finance
22, 320 – 344.
Brown, David T., Christopher M. James, and Robert M. Mooradian, 1994, Asset sales by
financially distressed firms, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 233 – 257.
Campbell, John Y., and Glen B. Taksler, 2003, Equity volatility and corporate bond yields,
The Journal of Finance 58, 2321–2350.
Campello, Murillo, Erasmo Giambona, John R. Graham, and Campbell R. Harvey, 2011,
Liquidity management and corporate investment during a financial crisis, Review of Fi-
nancial Studies 24, 1944–1979.
Campello, Murillo, John R. Graham, and Campbell R. Harvey, 2010, The real effects of
financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics
97, 470 – 487.
Chen, Long, David A. Lesmond, and Jason Wei, 2007, Corporate yield spreads and bond
liquidity, Journal of Finance 62, 119–149.
Collin-Dufresne, Pierre, Robert S. Goldstein, and Spencer J. Martin, 2001, The Determi-
nants of Credit Spread Changes, Journal of Finance 56, 2177–2207.
Das, Sanjiv R., and Paul Hanouna, 2009, Hedging credit: Equity liquidity matters, Journal
of Financial Intermediation 18, 112–123.
121
Denis, David J., and Valeriy Sibilkov, 2010, Financial constraints, investment, and the value
of cash holdings, Review of Financial Studies 23, 247–269.
Dick-Nielsen, Jens, 2009, Liquidity Biases in Trace, Journal of Fixed Income 19, 43–55.
Duchin, Ran, Oguzhan Ozbas, and Berk A. Sensoy, 2010, Costly external finance, corporate
investment, and the subprime mortgage credit crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 97,
418 – 435.
Ederington, Louis, Wei Guan, and Zongfei Yang, 2012, Bond Market Event Study Method-
ology, Working paper, University of Oklahoma.
Edmans, Alex, and William Mann, 2013, Financing through asset sales, Working paper,
The University of Pennsylvania Wharton School.
Eisfeldt, Andrea L., and Adriano A. Rampini, 2006, Capital reallocation and liquidity,
Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 369–399.
Fama, Eugene F, and James D MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical
tests, Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–36.
Faulkender, Michael, and Mitchell A. Petersen, 2006, Does the source of capital affect capital
structure?, Review of Financial Studies 19, 45–79.
Faulkender, Michael, and Rong Wang, 2006, Corporate financial policy and the value of
cash, The Journal of Finance 61, 1957–1990.
Gamba, Andrea, and Alexander Triantis, 2008, The Value of Financial Flexibility, Journal
of Finance 63, 2263–2296.
Gavazza, Alessandro, 2010, Asset liquidity and financial contracts: Evidence from aircraft
leases, Journal of Financial Economics 95, 62–84.
Geske, Robert, 1979, The valuation of compound options, Journal of Financial Economics
7, 63–81.
Giesecke, Kay, Francis A. Longstaff, Stephen Schaefer, and Ilya Strebulaev, 2011, Corporate
bond default risk: A 150-year perspective, Journal of Financial Economics 102, 233 –
250.
Graham, John R, and Campbell R Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate
finance: evidence from the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187–243.
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